freedom
to organize

VOLUME ONE
Best Practices

CALD Political Party Management Series
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This series is based on the CALD Political Party Management Workshops. It was during my final year as CALD Executive Director that the first political party management workshop was held in Jakarta in 2007. Like the CALD communications workshop that started much earlier in 2003, this workshop has since become a regular event. This book is CALD’s recognition of the importance of communication and organization in political parties.

During my tenure as CALD Executive Director from 1999 to 2007, there have been constant suggestions from various CALD members and partners that CALD publications must have a practical orientation. It must be able to impart lessons and practical solutions that directly address the concerns of its core audience—the members of CALD member parties who are not only officials and members of political parties but are also legislators, national and local government executives and staff of the legislative and executive branches of government. The series is a response to this need.

We look forward to next volume of the series where the best practices of political party management of the National Council of the Union of Burma, Democratic Party of Hong Kong, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Civil Will-Green Party of Mongolia and the Liberal Party of Sri Lanka will be featured.

John Joseph S. Coronel
Editor
FOREWORD

Political parties have been, and continue to be, one of the weakest, most distrusted, most discredited and most maligned institutions in Asia.

In a region known for its authoritarian rulers, ‘benevolent dictators’ and populist leaders, such claim should not come as a surprise. In the hands of these types of leaders, political parties become merely extensions or appendages of their personal rule. In cases when political parties matter, such as in communist countries, their indistinguishable structure from the government make them, in most cases, reviled by the general public who bear the brunt of oppressive government policies.

The culture of patronage also plays a role. While the region made significant strides in fostering economic development and continues to be the world’s foremost “engines of growth”, the gap between the rich and the poor within and among Asian countries persists, making the population prone to patronage politics.

This dreadful combination of strongman (or communist) rule and patron-client relations create an inhospitable terrain for the operation and development of political parties. Absence of strong ideological agenda, shifting membership and alliances, and personality-dependent organization are just some manifestations of this sorry state of affairs.

However, all is not lost. While the politics of violence and patronage persists in the region, there are still political parties which have successfully survived and thrived despite the odds stacked against them.

In Cambodia, for example, the political party which I founded, the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), has been routinely subjected to political killings and judicial persecution since its inception up to the present. Despite these difficulties, however, SRP managed to become the biggest opposition party in Cambodia, and the only political party that can realistically mount a challenge to the monolithic rule of Hun Sen, the longest reigning leader of Southeast Asia.

The case of Cambodia shows that political parties, guided by the right ideals and values, can also be potent agents of positive change.

Political parties can better perform this role when they have democratic, inclusive structures and transparent, accountable procedures. These, in essence, are the core elements of effective political parties.

The desire to make stronger and more institutionalized political parties in the region serves as the inspiration behind this book. The Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD), as a network of liberal and democratic political parties in Asia, has been a firm believer that the success of democracy rests on the presence of strong political parties.

Through this book of best practices in party management, CALD hopes to make its humble contribution to the maturing of Asian political parties, and consequently, to the cause of democracy and freedom in Asia and beyond.

This handbook is for CALD members and more importantly, members of CALD political parties. For as Dee Hock, the founder and former CEO of Visacard, once said, “an organization, no matter how well designed, is only as good as the people who live and work in it.”

We cannot be effective agents of reform if we cannot run efficient, transparent and accountable political parties. Indeed, with the freedom to organize comes the responsibility to do things right.

by SAM RAJHNY
Chair, Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats
Political parties are indispensable in a democracy. Despite the claim that political parties are already undergoing an inexorable process of “decay, decline and decomposition”, it cannot be denied that to this day, no one has demonstrated how democratic government could work without political parties.

The indispensability of political parties in a democracy can be traced to the numerous functions that they perform in such context. Political parties, for one, mobilize the electorate by recruiting candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan attachments, educating the public and stimulating voter participation. They also provide varying degrees of policy direction to governments and train and supply potential leaders. More importantly, they help in stabilizing the political system by legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control political power (Diamond and Gunther, 2001).

In recognition of the importance of political parties in a democracy, and of the need to continuously improve political party organization and operation, the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD) has launched the Political Party Management Workshops. The general objective of these workshops is to equip CALD member parties with knowledge and skills to develop and strengthen their respective party organizations. To date, CALD has already conducted four workshops on political party management in Jakarta, Indonesia (2007), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (2008), Phnom Penh, Cambodia (2010), and Bangkok, Thailand (2011).

In these workshops, CALD member parties shared their experiences and best practices on different aspects of party management – from day-to-day administration and fundraising to running a campaign...
and political mobilization. The exchanges in these events led to the following realizations: (1) political parties, whether in government or in opposition, face relatively similar issues and problems with regard to party administration and management; and (2) there are best practices on party management that can be replicated or adopted by political parties everywhere, regardless of the political, economic and social contexts where they operate.

These realizations serve as the impetus for the publication of this handbook. Through this, CALD seeks to emphasize the importance of making party structures and procedures democratic, inclusive and grounded on principles of transparency and accountability. More specifically, this handbook hopes to achieve the following objectives:

• to provide background information about CALD member parties and the political, electoral and party systems of countries where they operate;
• to highlight best practices of CALD member parties on various aspects of party management, particularly those practices which can be replicated or adopted; and
• to synthesize the discussions and learnings from previous political party management workshops.

**Best Practices of Effective Parties**

In modules produced by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs or NDI (2003), it was argued that there are three fundamental characteristics of successful political parties that transcend geographic boundaries and ideologies. In its “triangle of party best practices”, NDI argued that effective political parties: (1) “develop and maintain democratic internal structures; (2) consistently revitalize their membership through outreach to new sectors; and (3) promote and enforce transparency and accountability.”

These best practices were put under the general headings of internal democracy, outreach and transparency. Internal democracy is gauged by the presence of transparent, accountable and inclusive rules, organizations and processes. Its observance is claimed to result in a number of benefits for political parties. For one, political parties which operationalize this principle tend to be better organized and find more resources. Furthermore, open and inclusive structures allow parties "to run more effective, dynamic and competitive campaigns, attract a
broader base of talent in staff and volunteers, expand and enhance support among the base and tap into more human and financial resources” (NDI, 2003).

Outreach, in essence, pertains to the political party’s presence and appeal to diverse constituencies. The party’s reach to different groups or organizations naturally increases the party’s base of support. Moreover, bringing these groups and individuals into the democratic process creates stronger governing institutions and better public policies (NDI, 2003).

Finally, transparency refers to openness of the political party to its members and voters. Benefits from instilling transparency include: (1) allowing parties to act in reflection of their values, thus improving the quality of party leaders and members who believe and act in accordance to those values or mission; (2) helping combat corruption by clarifying rules and providing disciplinary mechanisms that sanction unethical or corrupt behaviour; and (3) improving public confidence in and perception of parties, resulting in more funds and votes (NDI, 2003).

While each of the six case studies included in this volume reflects elements of internal democracy, outreach and transparency, it would still be useful to group the cases based on these three general features of effective political parties:

- **Internal Party Democracy**: Liberal Party (LP) of the Philippines’ research, policy and training institute-building and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan’s primary elections;

- **Outreach**: Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) of Cambodia’s grassroots organizing; Singapore Democratic Party’s (SDP) new media strategies; and Democrat Party (DP) of Thailand’s recruitment of youth candidates; and

- **Transparency**: Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia’s (PGRM) fundraising and financial management.

The strength of a political party emanates from how it involves its members and the general public in party affairs. John Joseph Coronel probes this issue by looking at LP’s research, policy and training institute-building activities, particularly the party’s link with the liberal think tank, the National Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS) and its conduct of Basic Orientation Seminar on Liberal Democracy (BOLD). The relationship with NIPS embodies the party’s desire to ensure that legislative and executive agendas are “guided by concrete platforms that result from a democratic process of consultation within the party and outside to include the various stakeholders like civil society and grassroots organizations.” BOLD, on the other hand, aims to inculcate in prospective or new members the principles and values of liberal democracy in order to make them ideologically grounded and consequently, more active and empowered to participate in party processes.

In his account of DPP’s primary elections, Celito Arlegue looks at the effectiveness of incorporating various configurations of public support in the selection of party’s candidates for elections. Using election outcomes as a gauge, he came to the conclusion that DPP primary elections resulted in “qualified success.” He said that “while the procedure did not always result in electoral victory, it arguably produced qualified contenders who posted strong showings in the actual elections. It also increased the democratic profile of the DPP as a party that truly practices what it preaches.”

Internal party democracy increases the appeal of political parties to the general public. This, however, does not automatically translate to additional members or votes. Political parties still have to devise effective strategies to mobilize the public to support their cause. SRP’s...
grassroots organizing, as observed by Arlegue, proved to be successful despite the restrictive political environment because it is guided by the following principles: empowerment of local branches; speaking the language of the people; and leadership by example. He concluded by saying that the success of SRP grassroots mobilization strategies rests on “putting the people at the front and center of all political party activities. In doing so, the party has planted the seeds of true democracy in a country that desperately yearns for it.”

Another country that yearns for true democracy is Singapore. Like Cambodia, Singapore also constrains the political milieu to the point that it becomes extremely difficult for the political opposition to survive, much less operate as a viable political alternative. Given the limited political space, the SDP, as documented in the article of Chinh Pham, has taken the battle to the digital arena. By building a multi-platform media framework, linking to local, regional and international media, and professionalizing communication outputs, Pham argued that “the party has established itself as an advocate of true democracy that is in tune with the desires and needs of the young nation.”

While Thai democracy is more advanced than Cambodia or Singapore, political turmoil in recent years suggests that it is far from being consolidated. Democratic consolidation entails that both the present and future generations consider democracy as “the only game in town.” In response to the political disdain or indifference of the younger generation, DP has embarked on three flagship programs that aim to increase youth participation in politics and party affairs. These programs, as described in the article of Michael Vincent Espina, “have attracted young liberals whose active engagements in youth in politics have resulted in a significant increase of young candidates for parliamentary elections.”

Democracy entails political party’s adherence to principles of transparency and accountability, especially in the management of its assets. In Espina’s chapter on PGRM, he highlighted not only the financial independence that emanates from the party’s ownership of real estate properties and engagement in business ventures but also the “stringent management of financial resources” observed by the party. As a result of PGRM’s strict adherence to accountability and transparency in budget and financial management, the party and its officials have not been embroiled in any financial scandals involving either governmental or party funds.

**Towards Stronger Parties in Asia**

In Asia, it has been observed that many countries have weak political party systems that are personality-oriented and patronage-based with an obscure platform or agenda. As aptly described by Sachsenröder (1998), “…organizational structures within many (Asian) parties seem at least to be fragile, if not completely volatile. Capricious changes of positions, leaders or even large numbers of the membership, changing alliances through mergers, splits and newly emerging parties in all manner of unlikely coalitions between strangest bedfellows give confusing signals to voters and observers alike.” While this claim is not without basis, the cases included in this handbook show that there is hope for more institutionalized and stronger party systems and political parties in the region.

Presence of democratic party structures, outreach to different sectors of society, and adherence to principles of transparency and accountability result in numerous benefits that make political parties better-equipped to perform effectively their role in society.
Democratic society entails the existence of functioning political parties. For political parties to function well, they need to continuously improve on the way they manage their affairs. Through this handbook, CALD hopes to help its members and other interested political parties move towards more democratic and inclusive party management practices.

by CELITO ARLEGUE
Executive Director,
Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats

References


**From the International Foundation for Electoral Systems Election Guide [http://electionguide.org/].**
Sam Rainsy Party of Cambodia

Cambodia’s main opposition party is a political organization with a vision and commitment dedicated toward genuine reform, better quality of life and justice for all. The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) is fully committed to building roads for a peaceful transition towards liberal democracy in the Kingdom of Cambodia through its motto of “Integrity, Truth, Justice.”

SRP’s struggle towards this goal has never been easy. In January 2010, Sam Rainsy, MP and leader of the Cambodian opposition, was sentenced in absentia to two years in prison. This was in addition to a 10-year sentence handed down in 2009, after he was convicted for racial incitement and the destruction of public property. Sam Rainsy has since been in self-imposed exile in Europe but continues his work with the party through online conferences and international meetings.

On 21 October 2010, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Cambodia that strongly denounced “all politically motivated sentences against representatives of the opposition and NGOs,” particularly those against Sam Rainsy. It called upon Cambodian authorities to engage in political and institutional reforms to build a democratic state and “guarantee free and fair political expression without intimidation and harassment.”

On 19 October 2011, Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Governing Council adopted unanimously a resolution that stated that the IPU reaffirmed Sam Rainsy’s gesture of pulling out temporary border markers as a political gesture, and that, consequently, the courts should never have been seized to resolve a political matter, which rather should have given rise to a debate within parliament. In the resolution, the IPU said it deeply regretted that the Prime Minister’s clear statement on the question of border post #185 had not as yet led to any initiatives with a view to settling this case, which indisputably may impair the democratic process in Cambodia.

The IPU then called once again on the authorities, including Parliament, “to take action with a view to Mr. Sam Rainsy’s rehabilitation so as to enable him to resume his rightful place as a member of the National Assembly and to stand as a candidate in the next parliamentary elections.”

The SRP continues to struggle to strengthen democratic institutions and instill democratic reforms in the country. In his New Year message for 2011, Sam Rainsy stated that “Cambodia needs true progress, modernity, sustainable and equitable economic development, social justice, decent employment for the large number of young people entering the job market, increased well-being for the entire population, and an intelligent and strong defense of the vital interests of the nation.”
The mainland Southeast Asian state of Cambodia remains as one of the region’s most problematic countries. Support from the international donor community comprises almost half of the Cambodian government’s annual budget, but this failed to bring about both political and economic development in the country. The de facto one party-rule of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) has persisted for more than three decades, sustained by manipulated elections, a rubber-stamp parliament, a politicized judiciary, a muzzled media, and societal control through violence and patronage. The entrenchment of this one-party rule, and the corruption that goes with it, have turned Cambodia into one of the poorest countries in the world as per rankings of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Cambodia’s political and economic backwardness served as the impetus for the formation of the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). Founded in 1995 by Sam Rainsy, a Member of Parliament (MP) and former Minister of

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1. In 2011, the CPP attempted to extend its control to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by proposing a law that, according to the Human Rights Watch (2012), gives the government “wide discretion to shut down associations and NGOs.”
2. In WB’s 2011 gross domestic product (GDP) rankings, Cambodia is placed no. 121 out of 192 countries. IMF’s 2012 World Economic Outlook Database, on the other hand, ranked Cambodia no. 142 out of 181 countries in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita.
Finance, as the Khmer National Party (KNP), the party was forced to change its name less than three years after its founding when a splinter group, allegedly paid off by the CPP, claimed the party’s name. The court, unsurprisingly, sided with the splinter group, pushing party leader Sam Rainsy to eponymously name the party so the voters could identify the party with him (Kovick and Thornton, 2003).

From its inception until the present, the party has been constantly subjected to political violence and legal harassment. Sam Rainsy escaped several assassination attempts, such as a deadly grenade attack at a campaign rally in 1997 and another bloody attack at the Interior Ministry in 1998. Several dozens of party officials and supporters were murdered in a long series of acts of political violence perpetrated with total impunity. Furthermore, Sam Rainsy was unconstitutionally expelled from the National Assembly in 1995 and 2005, although he managed to regain his parliamentary seat in subsequent elections. In 2011 -- for the third time -- Sam Rainsy was stripped of his parliamentary seat and unconstitutionally expelled from parliament by the ruling party. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years in jail under political charges and, at the time of writing, remains to be in a self-imposed exile (Sam, 2012).

Despite the political and legal persecution, the party’s membership and popularity grew rapidly. According to a report of the SRP to the 1st CALD Party Management Workshop in 2007, the membership of the party grew from 178,707 in 1996 to 720,000 members in 2006. Most of its members are active throughout Cambodia and in other countries as well. The SRP has branches in operation in major cities of Australia, Canada, Belgium, France, Japan, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States.

The benefits of expanding membership base are, of course, multifold. Scarrow (2005) points out a number of beneficial reasons why parties need members:

1. **Volunteer labor** (organized membership helps get the political party’s message out);
2. **Candidates** (active membership is a good source of prospective candidates);
3. **Financial support** (party dues and donations serve as an important source of revenues for political parties);
4. **Connection to supporters** (inclusiveness enhances the political party’s linkage function); and
5. **Legitimacy** (a large and active membership may translate to a broad base of grassroots support and in turn a broad mandate from the electorate during elections).

These advantages were reaped by the SRP, as evidenced by its increasing electoral presence and support. As reported by the party in the 2007 Party Management Workshop, even with dozens of active members lost due to politically motivated killings, the SRP continued to gain more support from the people. This was evident in the Commune (Municipal) Council elections in 2002 and 2007, which saw an increase in SRP’s commune seats from 12% to 23%. While the SRP’s percentage of seats slightly declined after the 2012 Commune Elections, the party still obtained the highest percentage of seats among all opposition parties. Moreover, in senatorial elections held in early 2012, the number of senators from the party increased fivefold – from two to 11.

One of the primary reasons why the SRP has been able to expand its membership and electoral base, despite the odds stacked against it, is its successful grassroots organizing. Grassroots organizing, simply put, is a mode of organizing from the ground up. From a political party
perspective, grassroots organizing is the mobilization of the community to support party goals and objectives.

**Evolution of SRP's Grassroots Mobilization Strategies**

The SRP may not have gained power within Cambodia's governing structure but its base for power within and outside Cambodia continues to grow. In the SRP's report to the 2nd CALD Party Management Workshop in 2008, the SRP boasts of its strong grassroots organizational base with numerous volunteers. This grassroots organization is complemented by support groups overseas, which have been instrumental in the party's fundraising activities.

According to SRP Spokesperson and Member of Parliament Yim Sovann (2012), the party's grassroots mobilization could be divided into two stages. In its early years, the SRP targeted intellectuals, workers, civil servants and motor taxi drivers. During this time, it was difficult for the party to penetrate the rural population, which had become dependent to the ruling party's provision of patronage.

In recent years, however, the SRP expanded its base by targeting farmers. This change was brought about by increasing resentment of the rural population of the ruling party's land-grabbing activities. As what Strangio (2012) noted, "Millions of hectares of land have been leased to foreign development companies working in cahoots with local tycoons, turning the wild landscape of rural Cambodia into a patchwork of rubber, cashew, sugar and cassava plantations." Chunks of land in the urban areas, on the other hand, have been apportioned for glitzy housing and commercial development. According to the report of Human Rights Watch (2012), intimidation and violence perpetuated by security forces have forced many people to accept paltry compensation packages and resettlement in remote areas. An estimated 400,000 people have been
displaced by these “land concessions”, while more than half of arable land has been turned over to private agro-industrial projects (Miller, 2012).

The SRP has truly given meaning to democracy by building the party from the ground up. In comparing SRP’s strategies with those of the ruling party, Yim (2012) claimed that “CPP has no strategy but to buy votes, threaten and intimidate opponents, human rights activists and farmers and those who stand up against bad local authorities and corrupt officials. Furthermore, the CPP is using the court as political tool to muzzle the opposition leaders. The country’s electoral commission has also been used to manipulate the elections.”

Main Principles Governing SRP’s Grassroots Mobilization

Grassroots organizing, as noted above, is the mobilization of local communities to support party objectives and activities. It brings about many advantages. For one, it ensures the survival and responsiveness of political parties, as it keeps parties grounded with the issues and needs of their constituency. Political parties which engage in grassroots organizing also empower those sectors which are traditionally marginalized. Furthermore, political parties with grassroots organization have greater propensity to contribute to the institutionalization of democracy, as they foster people’s involvement in both party and state affairs.

In a predominantly agrarian Cambodia, the CPP continues to have significant control of grassroots communities. The use of intimidation and patronage keeps the rural population at the mercy of the ruling party. Opposition supporters are routinely threatened and killed. Those who support the CPP are given monetary benefits and access to government services. To make matters worse, economic growth in recent
years, together with support from foreign and local businessmen buying political influence, enabled the ruling party to entrench patronage networks all throughout the country. As analyst Caroline Hughes (quoted from Strangio, 2010) said, the weakness of Cambodian opposition in rural areas is due to the fact that "the government has worked consistently to reduce the political space for any kind of organized activism on any issue."

Despite this, the SRP has made a significant headway in encouraging grassroots support for the party. SRP's grassroots mobilization strategies revolve around three governing principles: empowerment of local branches; speaking the language of the people; and leadership by example.

**Empowerment of Local Branches**

SRP is arguably the most decentralized of Cambodian political parties. The party has advisory councils at the provincial, district and commune levels which make decisions and set their own programs of action.

In 2006, the SRP further decentralized the party by allowing party members to select village and commune leaders through direct voting at the local party level instead of through appointment by the SRP's Central Committee.

These networks of village and commune leaders have been tapped by the party in mobilizing voters at the local level.

Comparing SRP with the CPP, Sam Rainsy (quoted from Strangio, 2010) said, “They appoint their cadres – their apparatchiks – at the grassroots, but we are the only party that has organized elections.”

**Speaking the Language of the People**

Considering the grinding poverty in Cambodia, the SRP highlighted in their campaigns bread-and-butter issues such as inadequate living wages, poor working and living conditions, the high price of gasoline and limited employment opportunities for the youth. The party also tackles other broader and more general issues such as corruption and environmental preservation, but it relates these issues still to the population’s more immediate concerns so that they would have more resonance.

The emphasis on the so called "gut" issues is also due to the fact that many Cambodians, as a result of flawed educational system, do not have basic understanding and appreciation of democracy, human rights and rule of law.

In order to address constraints to political communication, the party has been using the social media. It has produced its own video spots to enlighten the people and to expose the true state of the country. SRP members have conducted door-to-door campaigns to distribute CDs which tackle important issues and SRP's proposed solutions.

Through this strategy, the party has been able to promote human rights, freedom, civic duties and participation of the people in building the foundations for democratic society.

SRP's principles have always been based on democracy, human rights and freedom. Its message is to empower the people to use their constitutional rights. By connecting these to issues that the people can immediately relate to, the party has been able to educate the population also on democratic principles and values.
Leadership by Example

To increase political awareness and civic involvement, party officials get directly involved with the people in conflict areas by leading protests, demonstrations, and strikes.

Party officials participate in community meetings throughout the country at both national and local levels. They engage the people through public forum, debates and group discussions on issues related directly to their needs. The daily presence of party activists, as well as elected officials such as MPs and senators, give the people confidence in expressing their views and providing solutions to conflicts. There were instances in the past, for example, when SRP-organized workers and farmers strike on their own or form networks that deal directly with local authorities.

Furthermore, the party has also regularly attended political events organized by non-governmental organizations. These provide venues for the party to maintain regular contacts with voters.

Through these strategies, SRP has steadily increased the numbers of popular votes and seats it gained at both national and local elections.

Despite the SRP’s success in grassroots mobilization, there are still a number of issues and problems that remain. The court continues to be controlled and used by the CPP as a political tool to crack down on its opponents. Constant threats and intimidations including legal cases filed against party leaders, MPs and local officials remain to be a problem. Limited access to local media including radio and TV hinder capacity to bring information to marginalized communities. These problems are exacerbated by SRP’s lack of monetary resources.
Conclusion

SRP’s journey to become Cambodia’s biggest opposition party can indeed be attributable to the success of its grassroots mobilization strategies. By empowering its local branches, speaking the language of the people, and leadership by example, the party has been able to respond to the challenges of an opposition party operating in a highly restrictive political environment.

Based from the SRP’s experience, effective grassroots mobilization strategies hinge on the following: 1) transfer of party management responsibilities to local leaders; 2) political communication should be done in a language that people understand, beginning with personal/local issues then going to national concerns later; and 3) party leaders should be at the forefront of political movements, enhance the sense of moral duty of party activists, and maintain regular contacts with voters.

The success of SRP in grassroots mobilization, in essence, results from putting the people at the front and center of all political party activities. In doing so, the party has planted the seeds of true democracy in a country that desperately yearns for it.

by Celito Arlegue, CALD Executive Director


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References

COUNTRY PROFILE

Malaysia

Population: 28,728,607 (July 2011)

Government Structure

Chief of State: Sultan Abdul HALIM Mu'adzam Shah

Head of Government: Prime Minister NAJIB bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak

Assembly: Malaysia has a bicameral Parliament (Parlimen) consisting of the Senate (Dewan Negara) with 70 seats and the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) with 222 seats.

Electoral System

The Sultan is elected by hereditary state rulers to serve a 5-year term.
The Prime Minister is designated by parliament.

In the Senate (Dewan Negara), 44 members are appointed by the monarch to serve 3-year terms and 26 members are elected by the state legislatures to serve 3-year terms*. In the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) 222 members are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve 5-year terms.

Future elections

Parliamentary - March 2013

Past elections

Parliamentary - July 26, 1998

Parliamentary - July 27, 2003

Parliamentary - July 27, 2008

*44 seats appointed by paramount ruler, 26 elected by 13 state legislatures

**From the International Foundation for Electoral Systems Election Guide [http://electionguide.org/].

PARTY PROFILE

Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia

Since its founding in 1968, the Malaysian People’s Movement Party or Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (PGRM) has seen growth and strength despite external constraints and internal problems. Through sincere leadership, pragmatic strategies, and non-communal approaches, PGRM obtained mass support to strive for an egalitarian united Malaysia characterized by racial harmony, social justice, economic equality, political democracy, and cultural liberalism. PGRM’s receptiveness to people’s criticisms and advices and its sensitivity to their needs and aspirations are two major factors that contribute in making it a dynamic and resilient political force in Malaysia.

As PGRM expands its organizational base, it will continue to strive to harness greater influence at both the grassroots and governmental levels. The party will continue to seek the partnership with the people based on the principle that MALAYSIAN NATIONALISM is the most effective weapon to combat the root causes of communalism, extremism, religious fanaticism, and cultural chauvinism.

The International Relations and Affairs Bureau under the leadership of Ng Lip Yong reflects the party’s commitment to playing a greater and more meaningful role in the international and regional political arena. Besides council meetings, members of the Bureau and leaders of PGRM regularly participate in CALD conferences, workshops, and other programs.
Political party finance is a fundamental concern of any political party anywhere in the world. As in any other organization, a political party cannot function effectively without the needed human resources and logistics, which require financing, besides volunteerism.

During elections, funds are crucial to launch and sustain campaigns to cover various costs including advertising and media work, rallies and related events, poll watching, among others. As a political party must continue to function and serve its constituents in between elections, it needs funds for its day-to-day operations; for its research institute and other allied organizations; for its other projects and activities to recruit and sustain membership; and for rallying public support for its members, programs and advocacies.

Political parties are indispensable in a democracy. How well a political party can motivate and mobilize its members and supporters is driven
by its ideology and the causes it advocates, its leadership quality, organizational strength and service to the people. Equally important, how well it raises funds and manages its finances earmark its competence as an organization (Ohman & Zainulbhai, 2009). Therefore, the employment of efficient and ethical practices for party funding contributes to the quality of a country’s democracy.

Nassmacher (2003) cites certain common elements as best practices in political party funding, as follows: (1) contributing to public confidence by means of improved transparency; (2) encouraging grassroots funding without trying to make it the only source of financing for party activity; (3) discouraging “dangerous” sources of political funds without expecting too much of “catchy” bans and symbolic limits; (4) providing public funding as a partial substitute, but tie subsidies to party’s own fundraising efforts via matching or reimbursement provisions; and (5) creating incentives to address potential contributors as well as potential fundraisers. Except for public funding, the Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (PGRM) or Malaysian People’s Movement Party meets the above-said criteria.

While most parties worry about their organization’s funding, PGRM, as well as other successful parties in Malaysia, have undertook and refined practices which can be shared with political parties from CALD and the region.

Money as an Instrument, Not Impediment

According to Nassmacher (2003), an ideal formula for political party finance would be a balance of private and public funding. This way the government encourages a plurality of political parties yet the political party retains the independence of a private organization. Furthermore, income, sales, property and inheritance taxes should not be levied on political parties.

The government of Malaysia neither disburses public funds for political parties nor extends legal tax incentives to donors of political parties. But any source of funds received by a political party can be exempted from taxation upon application. Despite the absence of public funding for parties and tax incentives for their donors, political parties in Malaysia are subject to regulations. Malaysia’s Societies Act of 1966 empowers the Registrar of Societies, under the Ministry of Home Affairs, to regulate political parties as well as non-government organizations (NGOs). Among others, political parties are required to submit financial reports annually without the need to disclose the names of the benefactors.

There are no limits to contributions or spending outside campaign periods. An Election Commission is responsible for setting campaign expenditure limits for parliamentary and state assembly candidates pegged at RM 50,000 (USD 15,800) and RM 30,000 (USD 9,500), respectively. Financial reports must be filed with the Election Commission within 30 days after the elections and are disclosed to the public within six months. The law also requires financial annual records and audits to be submitted to the Registrar of Societies. The party may then disclose annual records and audits to the public at will (Thornton, 2003).
Given the absence of public funding and tax incentives, PGRM and other Malaysian parties take their own initiative when it comes to fundraising.

In the 2nd CALD Party Management Workshop, the PGRM delegates identified the party's ownership and management of some floors of the building, the Menara PGRM towers, as a major source of its funds. The funds raised from this property are enough to cover PGRM's annual administrative and operational costs. PGRM's Kuala Lumpur property includes its party's national headquarters and an auditorium that serves as venue for various PGRM events including conventions. The auditorium is often rented out for various functions to generate revenue for the party.

The party's present stable financial position is consequence of the party's most effective and fruitful method of building and strengthening the party's financial base; as noted by PGRM's Speaker of its National Delegates Conference Tan Sri Dr. Chin Fook Weng, who spoke in the said workshop. He noted that in 1985, led by its third president Tun Dr. Lim Keng Yaik, the party started implementing its plan of financial consolidation by purchasing land in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur upon which two towers would be built and later to be sold or leased and partly occupied by the PGRM national headquarters and the Wawasan Open University established by the party. Among the income generating components of this real estate property are office and commercial spaces, service apartments, car parks and complete conference facilities that have been in operation for several years now. Aside from its properties in Kuala Lumpur, PGRM has acquired several properties around the country which further contribute to PGRM's financial stability and operational sustainability.

All State Liaison Committees and some local divisions have undertaken fundraising projects to either purchase land to build state or division party headquarters or to buy existing buildings for this purpose. The basic principle of asset management is replicated at the state level: the property which can be partly rented out or leased will generate income, while serving as regional PGRM party headquarters. As local party offices are responsible for their own operations without financial support from the party headquarters, there is an impetus to undertake such an endeavor.

In Thornton's (2003) case study of Malaysian political parties, it was further noted that PGRM members of parliament are required to give a portion of their allowance to the party while all party members pay RM 2 (around USD 0.64) entrance fee and RM 2 annual subscription fee. Fundraising also takes place at all party levels and each office must submit annual financial reports to the national headquarters in Kuala Lumpur.

The party keeps very stringent management of its financial resources, as emphasized by Mr. Ng Lip Yong, a senior PGRM official and a former deputy minister and member of parliament. The management of the PGRM's finances is outlined in the party's constitution. It stipulates that fundraising activities and acquisitions at all levels must first be officially approved by the National Treasurer who must ensure that no one misuses the name of the party for personal benefits. Prior to acquiring any property, permission must be obtained from the National Treasurer to ensure that there are sufficient funds to undertake such an endeavor in order to avoid incurring debts and other potential liabilities. The PGRM national headquarters is the registered owner of all properties so that local members cannot dispose of the properties on their own. On top of that, any decision on or disposal of party assets must first be approved by the PGRM Central Committee. Then, it would have to be approved by a second tier, a trust consisting of very senior veterans of the party. The trust can veto the Central Committee's decision regarding the sale or disposition of any party property.

The National Treasurer is also responsible for disbursing all funds. All withdrawals from the party's account have to be signed jointly by the PGRM President and the Secretary General or Treasurer. External and internal audits are done every year and financial reports are disclosed to all party members. An accountant or accountancy firm is appointed by the National Delegates Conference which is responsible for approving
the audited financial reports. Audited reports are posted for examination by the delegates during the annual State Delegates Conference and the National Delegates Conferences. The National and State Treasurers have to answer any budget and finance-related question or issue that may be raised during these conferences.

**Conclusion**

PGRM’s effective budget regulation and revenue generation have made the party financially stable despite the absence of public funding in Malaysia and despite its lack of links to big corporate entities or personalities. Beyond its financial security, PGRM enjoys a level of financial independence allowing the organization to spend on extra-electoral projects. A shining example is the non-profit and service-oriented Wawasan Open University. The academy makes quality undergraduate and postgraduate education accessible and affordable for thousands of working people through open distance learning. Endeavors like Wawasan Open University allow PGRM to contribute to the nation’s democracy and economy in ways exceeding the traditional roles of a political party. PGRM is able to undertake this because of its sound budget and financial management, and more importantly, its commitment to the advancement of the Malaysian people.

For a political party anywhere in the world, fundraising and disbursements are the easiest ways for the abuse and misuse of party resources. This can be an area where the party can benefit from partnering with an external organization (NDI, 2003). In the absence of finance laws, political parties should adopt standards for financial disclosure to establish credibility among its members and promote the democratic value of transparency. PGRM upholds this principle of transparency by making internal and external audit reports available to all members. That is on top of the mandatory financial reports by Malaysia’s Societies Act. PGRM’s strictest adherence to accountability and transparency, especially with regard to budget and financial management, is evident by the fact that the party and its officials have not been tarnished by any financial scandal. Members are very conscious of the upholding of party’s image and integrity, based in part on financial independence.

In some countries, political parties are not allowed to own businesses or properties. This obstacle does not mean political parties should not be creative in securing legally available sources of party funding. Trying to find diverse ways of fundraising can be rewarding. A political party may likely be successful in approaching big donors such as in the corporate sector or even more meaningful support from NGOs and grassroots organizations (Neyts-Uyttebroeck & Hansen, 2011).

**by Michael Vincent Espina, CALD Project Officer**

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**References**


Ng, L. Y. (2012). Email Correspondence. 8 August.


**COUNTRY PROFILE**
**Philippines**

Population: 97,976,603 (July 2009 est.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Structure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chief of State:</strong> President Benigno Simeon AQUINO III*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Head of Government:</strong> President Benigno Simeon AQUINO III</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Assembly:</strong> Philippines has a bicameral Congress (Kongreso) consisting of the Senate (Senado) with 24 seats and the House of Representatives (Kapulungan Ng Mga Kinatawan) with 287 seats.</td>
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<th>Electoral System</th>
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<tr>
<td>The President is elected by plurality vote to serve a 6-year term.</td>
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<tr>
<td>In the Senate (Senado) 24 members are elected by plurality vote in multi-member constituencies to serve 6-year terms.* In the House of Representatives (Kapulungan Ng Mga Kinatawan), 230 members are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve 3-year terms and 57 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 3-year terms.***</td>
</tr>
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| *The president is both chief of state and head of government. |
| **One-half of members are elected every three years. There is one national constituency. Senators are elected at-large from the country. Electors may vote up to 12 times.** |
| **Under constitutional provisions, the PR tier must comprise 20 percent of total seats. While the constitution provides for a 250-member House, it also permits the legislature to change that size. Numbers above reflect the current apportionment. In the PR tier, members generally represent special "sectoral" minorities, though this constitutional provision was set to expire after three terms from 1987. (The 1987 constitution reserved half of these seats to said groups.) Under a 2009 court ruling related to the 2007 legislative elections, a party represented in one tier may not hold seats in the other, effectively reserving all PR seats to minor parties. The threshold in the PR tier is 2 percent, but no party may hold more than three seats in it. Prior to the 2009 ruling, elections would not necessarily fill all PR seats.*** |

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<tr>
<th>Future elections</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative</strong></td>
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<th>Past elections</th>
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<tr>
<td>Subnational - Legislative - October 25, 2010</td>
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<td>Legislative - May 10, 2010</td>
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<td>Presidential - May 10, 2010</td>
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***From the International Foundation for Electoral Systems Election Guide [http://electionguide.org/].
The Liberal Party (LP) was founded on 19 January 1946 by Manuel Roxas, the first President of the Third Philippine Republic. It was formed by President Roxas from what was once the “Liberal Wing” of the old Nacionalista Party. Two more presidents of the Philippines elected into office came from the LP: Elpidio Quirino and the redoubtable Diosdado Macapagal. Two other presidents came originally from the ranks of the LP, being former members of the Party who later chose to follow a different path and joined the Nacionalistas: Ramon Magsaysay and Ferdinand Marcos.

During the days leading to Martial Rule, Marcos would find his old Party as a potent roadblock to his quest for one-man rule. Led by Ninoy Aquino, Gerry Roxas, and Jovito Salonga, the LP would time and again hound the would-be dictator on issues like human rights and the curtailment of freedoms. Not even the declaration of Martial Law silenced the LP, and it continued to fight the dictatorship despite the costs. Many of its leaders and members would be prosecuted and even killed during this time.

In recent times, the LP was instrumental in ending more than half a century of U.S. military presence in the Philippines with its campaign in the Senate of 1991 to reject a new RP-US Bases Treaty. This ironically cost the Party dearly, leading to an LP defeat in the 1992 elections. In 2000, however, the LP showed its mettle by standing against the corruption of the Estrada administration, actively supporting the Resign-Impeach-Oust initiatives that led to People Power II. In 2004, the Party again stood its ground and withdrew its support from President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo following controversies of her election into office.

Benigno “Noynoy” S. Aquino III of the Liberal Party was elected as President of the Philippines in May 2010. At present, the LP has four members in the Senate and 84 members in the House of Representatives (approximately one-third of the roster), including the seats of House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. and three deputy speakers. At the local level, LP increased its number of governors from eight to 26. It has 17 vice governors and 178 provincial board members. The Party has also significantly increased its number of city and municipal government officials. LP is working to ensure that more Liberals are elected in the midterm 2013 elections.
The Politics of Conscience

During the 1992 elections, former Senate President and Liberal Party (LP) President, Jovito R. Salonga, ran for President of the Philippines. Amongst the candidates, the LP standard bearer was the only one with a comprehensive platform of governance covering a wide array of critical issues that affected most the Filipino people.

Philippine politics is often described as personality driven, with very little regard to platforms and party affiliations. But Salonga’s campaign focused on his agenda and platform, oftentimes, eschewing the populist tactics and rhetoric of his co-candidates. Unfortunately, Salonga, acknowledged as the leading pillar of Philippine liberalism, lost.

18 years later, the LP standard bearer, then Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino, campaigned with his social contract with the people as his focus and with two leading messages communicated to the electorate: “daang
matuwid” or the straight path that an Aquino administration promised to take and “kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap” or “if there is no corruption, there will be no poverty.” His running mate, then Senator and now Interior and Local Government Secretary and former LP President, MAR Roxas, echoed the guiding legacy of his grandfather, President Manuel Roxas, the founder of the party, as his battle cry: “Country above self!”

Of course, the victory of the second President Aquino was precipitated by the death of his iconic mother, Corazon C. Aquino, whose passing away reminded the people of the decency and dedication in public service that the late president who toppled the Marcos dictatorship embodied. And the timing was particularly relevant, as she died during the twilight of the corrupt and detested administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

However, several questions were asked as a result of LP’s victory: How much did the party contribute to the victory of President Aquino? Was the party relevant at all? Was President Aquino’s victory the result of an emotional outpouring for his beloved mother and his so-called contract with the people appreciated only by the middle class and the intelligentsia?

Though the LP was a necessary component of his campaign, it was deemed that it was not a sufficient factor for his victory. Nevertheless it played important, invaluable and indispensable roles in the campaign. The victory of President Aquino, therefore, presents the LP a rare opportunity to strengthen the party in terms of ideology, platforms and internal democracy. Being content with qualitative results measured solely in terms of the number of elected officials and senior government posts is for traditional politics. Success indicators beyond numbers are important to assess if LP is to live up to its reputation as having the most cohesive platform and as being the most ideologically defined amongst the mainstream political parties.

No less than President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, now LP Chairman and a former LP Secretary General, called upon his party mates in supporting his agenda of good governance and the restoration of public trust. Filipino Liberals “were threatened but never wavered,” President Aquino declared on January 2011 during the 65th LP foundation anniversary, “hurt, but never surrendered; tempted, but never sold out the trust of the people.”

**NIPS-tucked, More than Skin Deep**

Whether as a party in power, a partner in the ruling coalition or as an opposition party, the National Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS), the Philippine liberal think tank, is one concrete manifestation of the party’s commitment to making LP an exception to the rule: a major political party that is ideologically defined and whose legislative and (now that it is in power) executive agendas are guided by concrete platforms that result from a democratic process of consultation within the party and outside to include the various stakeholders like civil society and grassroots organizations.

In January 2011, the party’s constitution was amended to include the representation of sectoral leaders to its highest policy making body, the National Executive Council (NECO) with 20% of all NECO seats allocated to sectoral representatives. The party identified five sectors, namely: women, youth, labor, urban poor, and farmers/fisherfolks.

As stipulated in its constitution, LP is “a responsive, accountable and broad-based political party, unleashing the potential of an empowered citizenry through the Party’s liberal democratic ideals, cohesive membership and courageous, principled leadership.”

According to its website (www.nips.org.ph), “NIPS was founded in 1989 and remains as the principal political institute that undertakes programs for the promotion of liberalism and democracy in the Philippines. As an Institute committed to liberal politics, it necessarily works closely with the LP and other liberal groups and organizations. However, it is registered under Philippine laws as an independent, non-profit
organization with a separate legal personality from other organizations and parties. It is governed by a Board of Trustees composed of persons of known independence, integrity and respectability and is administered by an Executive Director. A majority of the members of the board are either active members or officers of the LP or are otherwise its supporters in some other way." CALD Secretary General, Secretary Neric Acosta, is currently NIPS Chairman and LP Vice President for Policy and former Chair of the CALD Women’s Caucus, Henedina Abad, MP, is a trustee.

NIPS provides “opportunities, facilities and services for the systematic study, development and promotion of liberal politics in the Philippines. It does this primarily through public advocacy and political education programs for liberal political leaders and their supporters. Specifically, the different activities of the Institute are directed at equipping the Filipino people with necessary orientation and skills to encourage their active participation in public affairs, whether during or between elections; increasing the Filipino people’s awareness of their civil and political rights, especially as these relate to the structures and processes of public institutions; assisting in the formation of viable and strong liberal orientated organizations as vehicles for articulating liberal views and perspectives in the national debate concerning important issues thereby promoting transparency in policy-making; facilitating a regular exchange of views and promoting consensus-building on critical issues of public concern in order to develop alternative solutions, and promoting partnership and cooperation with similarly inclined individuals and institutions at the national and international levels.”

NIPS also serves as “a forum where issues of national importance are discussed by liberal politicians, government officials, civil society, the business sector, civil society, academia, mass media and other sectors.”

NIPS is a vital partner of LP in pursuing the latter’s vision of “a just, prosperous, peaceful and caring civil society anchored on social equity, a vigorous market economy, political openness, ecological balance and an honest, effective government” as stated in the party constitution.

The period from 2004 to 2010 was crucial for the party starting out as a coalition partner of the majority party that won the 2004 national elections, then as an opposition party when the party suffered a serious division between the reformist block and those that remained loyal to President Arroyo despite the electoral scandals she faced, and finally emerging as the party in power in the 2010 national elections.

The then President of the Philippine Senate and LP and CALD Chair, Senator Franklin Drilon, outlined five major goals for the party during this period in the Liberal Party Strategic Plan, 2004-2010 as “the collective intention of our leaders, members and allies to institute... deep political changes and meaningful societal restructuring through a reliable party system” (Party in Power, 2005:2).
One of the five major goals identified is “the enrichment of the party platform of government through consultative mechanisms and the formulation of Party positions in key issues of national concern through consensus building at various levels of the Party structure” (Party in Power, 2005:2). NIPS is an indispensable organization in the formulation and implementation of the said plan.

Among the major consensus in terms of party direction in the immediate and longer terms during the Strategic Plan are strengthening the education, coordination and cohesion of Party members at the center and grassroots; and making party positions on burning issues of the day more broadly internally owned, more actively communicated externally, and more distinctly recognized as carrying greater influence and impact. In terms of party positions, four results were targeted: (1) the further education of LP members, (2) consensus on key directions that must be explicit, (3) positions on key issues that must be publicly declared, and (4) alliances based on party positions that must be affirmed (Party in Power, 2005).

The said Strategic Plan underscores the importance of the democracy forums initiated and continued by NIPS. Such democracy forums “build consensus among Party members and officials on (relevant) issues. This also gives the opportunity for local issues to be reflected in the development of the platform. As soon as the platform of governance is finalized, subsequent conducts of these types of forums would...ventilate Party positions on issues of national concern and engage other forces into a public debate” (Party in Power, 2005).

**Be BOLD, Be Free!**

A major undertaking of NIPS is the handling of the Basic Orientation on Liberal Democracy or BOLD Seminars in partnership with the LP. As its very name implies, BOLD Seminars attempt to impart basic liberal theories and principles to LP’s new recruits.
In 2005, a Primer on Liberalism was published by NIPS with the support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF). It was authored by Dr. Julio Teehankee, a NIPS Trustee and Chair of the Department of Political Science of the De La Salle University-Manila.

The primer is the soul of BOLD Seminars. The late NIPS President, Prof. Mario Taguiwalo, described the primer as "an introduction to a philosophy, ideology and body of political thought and practice that has been one of the foundations of many modern and progressive societies throughout the world...(presenting) the liberal viewpoint as activist, principled and committed" (Teehankee, 2005).

With the BOLD Seminars, the party hopes to impart and inculcate among its members the liberal ideals and its application in fighting what Prof. Taguiwalo summarized as "dictatorship, superstition, prejudice, discrimination, fundamentalism, vested interests, corruption and bad government among other evils that damage the comity and livability of our communities." Prof. Taguiwalo emphasized that liberalism must be seen as relevant to governance and development, as essential to nation-building and democracy as a continuing process, and as crucial in the citizens' search for a body of beliefs that recognizes diversity of views yet enables the formulation of collective solutions to common problems (Teehankee, 2005).

Dr. Teehankee divided the primer into four parts: the liberal philosophy, and the political, economic and social dimensions of liberalism. The primer explores liberalism inherently (its definition, basic characteristics, its core principles and values, etc.) and comparatively (how it is similar to or different from other ideologies from the left to the right of the political spectrum especially in terms of the political, economic and social dimensions). The major ideological formations in the Philippines—National Democracy, Social Democracy, Liberal Democracy and Christian Democracy—are differentiated in terms of their analyses and views of Philippine society, their vision for the country, their modes of struggle and political change and the parties and organizations represented behind each segment of the political spectrum. Given the holistic approach through the three dimensions mentioned, important issues including human rights, the rule of law, good governance, decentralization, the free market economy, access to opportunities and poverty reduction, civil liberties and "Asian values" are discussed (Teehankee, 2005).

The current BOLD curriculum covers, among others, the following topics: liberalism in the Philippines (ideologies and principles), LP: Building a People’s Party in the 21st Century, and President Aquino’s Social Contract with the Filipino people.

“Overall, NIPS is more of a training institute than a research and policy institute,” admitted Lambert Ramirez, NIPS Executive Director, explaining that a good portion of the institute’s time and resources is devoted to training programs like BOLD.

Now that LP is in power, the demand for BOLD seminars has grown multi-fold with the influx of new members. The solution is to train the trainers who will eventually be the ones to conduct the BOLD Seminars on the local chapter level. "We now only train facilitators who are expected to echo what they have learned (from the national or regional seminars)," clarified Gladys Sta. Rita, LP Director General. This explains the inclusion of mechanics and tips on how to conduct successful seminars in the curriculum. The headquarters concentrates on facilitators’ training and this has proven to be both cost-efficient and effective.

Admittedly, majority of the members are the supporters of LP leaders. But NIPS Director Ramirez is hopeful that with the thrust of expanding the sectors in both the membership and leadership, LPs new recruits will be less "leader-centric" and in the near future, more members who are not necessarily associated with LP leaders will join the party on their own volition. "LP is serious in grassroots organization," Ramirez asserted...
Walking the Tight Rope

The 2004-2010 Strategic Plan is correct in identifying the Liberal Party brand of principled political leadership as one of its strengths and most attractive quality to sell to the electorate. The LP label is “regarded as a distinct, attractive and eventually compelling brand of political leadership. While voters are expected to continue to choose on the basis of personalities, (the party) wants to make candidate’s affiliation with LP a publicly recognized signal of two things: an indication of quality political leaders offered by the party; and a positive factor to the eventual success of individual leaders who are part of the Party. LP offers good leaders and these leaders are going to do well” (Party in Power, 2005:7).

Unfortunately, given the realities of politics, not all new members, especially more senior elected officials like congressmen, governors and mayors, have joined the party because of its brand of political leadership. As in any other previous administration, after each election, a good number of politicians and their followers suddenly join whichever party is in power.

LP Acting President and former Secretary General, Joseph Emilio Abaya, MP, himself admitted that a year after the victory of President Aquino, the party had quadrupled in size. But unlike ruling parties in the past, LP has been more selective in its recruitment and it would be difficult for a politician of dubious repute to join the party (Coronel, 2011). Party stalwarts and the old guards who have been with the party even during its most difficult hours are tasked with ensuring that the party’s core principles and ideals are not compromised despite the influx of new members. Then and now, they remain as the keepers of the liberal faith.

As a party in power, the party is in a delicate balancing act. As it walks the tight rope, it must make sure that it does not surrender its core values for political expediency.

Senator Jovito Salonga who was first elected senator in 1965 and capped his political career as Senate President from 1987 to 1992 realized that actual problems are more complicated than what they appear to be and that democracy includes “the capacity to enter into realistic, morally defensible compromises.” Salonga also asserted that “principles without power cannot effect meaningful change. Power without principles leads to injustice. It is essential for the Liberal Party to have both principles and power.”

Philippine National Hero, Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, who was LP Secretary General when he was assassinated in 1983, put it succinctly, “life at best is second best; a perpetual compromise between the ideal and practical.”

by John Joseph Coronel, CALD Consultant and Former Executive Director

References


COUNTRY PROFILE

Singapore

Population: 4,657,542 (July 2010 est.)

Government Structure

Chief of State: President TONY TAN Keng Yam
Head of Government: Prime Minister LEE Hsien Loong
Assembly: Singapore has a unicameral Parliament with 94 seats.

Electoral System

The President is elected by plurality vote to serve a 6-year term.
The Prime Minister is appointed by the President.*
In the Parliament, 9 members are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve 5-year terms, 75 members are elected through a group representation constituency (GRC) system to serve 5-year terms, 9 members are nominated by the President and 9 members are appointed from a national compensatory list to serve 5-year terms.**

Future elections

Parliamentary - May 2016

Past elections

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<tr>
<th>Presidential</th>
<th>Parliamentary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 27, 2011;</td>
<td>May 7, 2011;</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 2005</td>
<td>May 6, 2006;</td>
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<td>November 3, 2001</td>
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*At the end of legislative elections, the leader of the majority party is usually appointed prime minister.
**Out of the 85 elected representatives, nine are elected through single member districts, and 75 in Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs). Each GRC has a district magnitude of four, five or six. Each party must present a list of candidates to fill each of the seats. Electors vote for one list, and the list with the most votes wins all the seats. One member of each list is required to be a member of the Malay, the Indian or another minority community. Independents may technically run in the GRCs, but they must do so on a joint-list.

PARTY PROFILE

Singapore Democratic Party

The Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) was constituted in 1980. It believes in, and is working toward restoring human, civil, and political rights in Singapore; fostering a vibrant and dynamic society based on pluralism and diversity; cultivating a transparent and accountable political system; establishing an economic system based on free competition and equal opportunity for all; removing all policies and practices that discriminate against the less fortunate, women, and minorities; and cooperating with democratic parties and organizations in Asia to achieve peace and sustainable development in the region.

It is the first opposition party in Singapore to have a youth wing (Young Democrats) and to deploy Internet as alternative media. It uses blogging, political videos, and online forums to reach out to the people. The Central Executive Committee (CEC) governs the party with Jufrie Mahmood as its Chair and Chee Soon Juan its Secretary-General.

SDP commemorated its 30th founding anniversary in February 2010 in the midst of facing continuing persecution by an authoritarian government for its belief in democracy and human rights. Party leaders and members have had to endure a series of government-orchestrated court cases, and even imprisonment, for exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of expression and assembly.

During the 2011 general elections, the Party garnered 36.8 percent of the valid votes in the constituencies it contested. The SDP was touted to be the most “improved” opposition party, making the largest gain in share of votes.

***From the International Foundation for Electoral Systems Election Guide [http://electionguide.org/].
With its leaders systematically subjected to political persecution and with virtually no access to mainstream media to espouse its causes, the opposition Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) has been figuratively painted in a corner with little room to maneuver. True to the Asian adage that crisis and opportunity can be one and the same, SDP activists used one of its few remaining "weapons" left—new media including social networks whose potential for democratic advocacy and action have been proven by young and technologically savvy Singaporean Democrats even before the dawning of the Arab Spring.

A small country with a land area of only 714 square kilometers and with a population of about five million people, Singapore is one of the world's most prosperous nations and is considered an important hub in the global trade of goods and services. It remains an economic tiger and future prospects show little signs of deceleration. However, as Singapore's economy prospers, its democratic record leaves much to be desired.

Behind Singapore's impressive economic record lies countless cases of violations of human rights and curtailment of civil liberties that inarguably taint the country's success story. While the dominant ruling People's Action Party (PAP) prides itself on steering the country to its current global status, the party diminishes its global credibility with such offenses committed by the state. The government of Singapore, which has been occupied by the PAP since the grant of self-government in 1959, has been criticized by international organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Freedom House.
ranks Singapore as one of the worst among developed nations in terms of press freedom. Criticisms and calls for change from within and from the international community have fallen on deaf ears as PAP continues to impose limits on the freedom of expression, association, and assembly in order to contain threats to its monopoly of political power.

PAP has been the dominant ruling party in Singapore for more than 50 years, winning a clear majority of parliamentary seats in every election, although in Singapore's 'first past the post' electoral system this has not necessarily been concomitant with the share of votes: for example, in the 2011 General Elections the party won 60.1% of the vote yet has 94% of seats. This political homogeny is largely due to a slew of PAP policies characterized by intolerance of opposition and public dissent but also through electoral procedures and regulations that clearly favor the ruling party. In addition, the party has often used "electoral sweeteners" just before the elections such as outright payments to households characterized as sharing of economic gains. In 2011, for example, these payments were made six days before the polls.

Cognizant of the need for true democratic values in the nation, the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) was founded in 1980. The SDP has since grown in strength and number and now stands firmly not only as a major opposition party but also as a party committed to advancing Singapore's global status without compromising the inherent rights of its people. In the face of heavy-handed government regulation of mainstream media, SDP has been able to reach and engage the citizens of Singapore by taking the political battle to the digital arena. Denied access to broadcast and print media, SDP has maximized the effectiveness of new media by creatively utilizing these digital tools to reach the Singaporean public. Through its innovative social media strategies, the party has established itself as an advocate of true democracy that is in tune with the desires and needs of the young nation.

PAP Regulations

While Singapore's constitution explicitly states that every citizen possesses the right to freedom of speech, assembly, and association, past and current PAP legislations clearly show that these liberties are not respected. The PAP government has instituted multiple regulations throughout the years that have directly contradicted democratic values enshrined in its constitution.

Since the introduction of radio and then television broadcasting, the influence and power of these mass media in shaping public opinion have grown exponentially. Not surprisingly, the PAP-controlled government has looked upon broadcast media with caution, regulating the broadcast industry with policies including censorship that border on authoritarianism. MediaCorp, a group of commercial media companies, controls much of broadcast media in Singapore. Indeed, MediaCorp is the only mass broadcaster on the island. However, behind these supposedly private companies is Temasek Holdings, a government-owned investment arm that is effectively under the control of the PAP.

As a case in point, MediaCorp has banned a documentary on SDP Secretary General, Dr. Chee Soon Juan, at the Singapore International Film Festival, while allowing a five-part documentary series on Singapore's PAP ministers to air on television.

The Media Development Authority, a government department, has censorship functions and has banned other films about Singapore's dissenting history which characterizes the government in a negative light. Films profiling political detainees have been banned.

Print media has similarly undergone strict regulations in favor of the PAP government. Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), whose management shareholders are also appointed by the government, works jointly with MediaCorp in creating pro-government content for public consumption. It publishes 18 newspapers in the four major languages of Singapore and more than 100 magazine titles throughout the region. In 2012,
Reporters without Borders ranked Singapore 135 of 179 countries in freedom of press.

Alongside numerous laws regulating mainstream media, such as the Newspaper and Printing Press Act, Broadcasting Act, and Undesirable Publications Act, there also exist certain laws that serve to suppress political opposition. With the Public Entertainment and Meetings Act and the Public Order Act, public demonstrations and cause-related public events including political rallies are only permitted after a valid license has been issued by the government. The government recently declared that permits for political rallies will never be granted as they are inimical to continued economic growth. Undeniably, this leaves little room for SDP to end the reign of PAP’s semi-authoritarian government and further its democratic cause.

**SDP Response Strategies**

Despite these challenges that can constrict the growth of any political party, SDP has dramatically strengthened throughout the past few years—a feat it largely attributes to its new media strategy.

With the emergence of popular social media sites, SDP is no longer at the mercy of mainstream media. Legally and effectively bypassing PAP regulations, SDP has created a robust online presence to communicate with the three million Singaporeans with internet access. SDP utilizes popular social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in conjunction with its official website—the core of its new media strategy. The SDP media strategy is threefold. First, build a coherent communications program supported by a multi-platform media framework. Second, enhance relationships with local, regional, and international mainstream and online media outlets. Third, professionalize the communications output.

The first goal of their three-pronged plan to build a multi-platform media framework is achieved by hyperlinking articles, photos, and
videos across all their media platforms. For example, YouTube videos are linked on SDP's Facebook, Twitter, and official website. Additionally, SDP provides tabs to share all articles to social media sites, such as Delicious, Diggit!, Google, Myspace, FriendFeed, and Yahoo. As an end result, each new media platform is linked, forming a network of social media outlets that allows internet users to effectively circulate SDP news and content across multiple platforms.

The second part of SDP's plan strives to connect to local, regional, and international mainstream media. In order to connect with the local and regional electorate, SDP members and volunteers actively share in the effort, often utilizing their own personal social media accounts to reach out to their own network of friends. SDP members also regularly contribute to online news portals in Singapore, such as "thenonlinecitizen". With an active online presence through its members and volunteers, SDP can exponentially disseminate its content throughout the population. To reach the international community, SDP sidesteps the domestic restrictions on the freedom of expression by engaging international news publications and blogs. On 18 July 2012, Dr. Chee wrote to the Yale-National University of Singapore president, expressing concern on the government's infringements on academic freedom. This letter subsequently circulated through blogs and garnered attention from international media sources, drawing global attention to the intolerance and repression of the PAP government. Dr. Chee has also contributed to The Guardian, a well-known and respected British national daily newspaper. The connection with the international community keeps external forces informed of current abuses of human rights and exerts pressure on the PAP government to instill democratic reforms.

The final part of SDP's new media plan strives to professionalize communications outputs. While SDP informally propagates SDP news and opinions on current social and political issues through its members and volunteers, there also exists a formal and focused Communications Unit within the party that is solely dedicated to the construction of SDP's digitally published content. The Communications Unit updates content on all of SDP's media platforms along specific guidelines that will be published in a Media Rule Book. These guidelines assure that content published across all platforms are in line with SDP's principles and beliefs. Once content is published on the social media platforms, the Communications Unit then analyzes website traffic data, Facebook likes and shares, YouTube views, and Retweets. The Communications Unit utilizes this data to better understand the tendencies of the online community so the party can reach them more effectively.

**Conclusion**

The constricting regulations of the PAP government leave opposition parties in Singapore very little to work with to remain relevant in the political discourse of the nation. Still, SDP persists, maximizing the effectiveness of the one resource at their disposal—new media. SDP's three-pronged approach to new media plays an essential role in reaching out to the Singaporean electorate. Undoubtedly, it is SDP's persistence and resourcefulness that has plagued the PAP government in recent years, and has led to recent SDP successes.

The success of SDP's new media campaign is evident in the results of the historic General Elections in 2011, which marked the highest number of contested seats since independence. SDP's vote share increased by 13.5 percent—a promising vote share that will likely increase in the next elections. These election numbers, however, do not tell the full story of SDP's success. SDP has seen increased traffic on their new media platforms, an increased attendance rate at events, and an increased

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1 The SDP Communications Unit is a 10-member team led by Communications Head – Dr. Vincent Wijeyasingha, Deputy Head – S. Balakrishnan, Technical Director – Alvin Ong and International Relations Coordinator – Frederique Soh.
number of volunteers and donations. With a refurbished website, increased media platform activity, and a growing party base, SDP will continue to make long strides for a more democratic Singapore.

by Chinh Pham, Former CALD Intern from Yale University

References


The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was founded on 28 September 1986 as the first Taiwanese-born political party in Taiwan and as the first opposition party created during the Martial Law period. At the time of the DPP’s founding, Taiwan existed under the authoritarian control of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang - KMT), which colonized Taiwan after losing against the Chinese Communist Party of China in 1949 in the civil war.

Founded mainly by family members and defense lawyers of political prisoners held by the KMT, the DPP consisted of political activists who had risked their freedom and lives to transform Taiwan’s political landscape. With the arrival of the DPP, a new era of rapid democratic change began in Taiwan, transforming a nation previously forced to endure decades of one-party authoritarian rule.

The DPP has since evolved into a party dedicated to ensuring social and political justice within Taiwan. The DPP has championed social welfare policies involving the rights of women, senior citizens, children, laborers, indigenous peoples, farmers, and other disadvantaged sectors of society. On the political front, the DPP has won many battles for free speech, free press, freedom of association, and respect for human rights. In 2000, Taiwan entered a new period of democracy when the DPP became the first ruling party in Taiwan other than the KMT.

Under two administrations with eight years in government, the DPP earned valuable experience as a young party. Currently, as Taiwan’s major opposition party, the DPP continues to strive in order to preserve democracy and to ensure a balanced and fair system of government that represents the will of the Taiwanese people.

For 2011, the DPP aligned itself with the current trend changes in Taiwan, listening to the voices of the public and issuing the 10-Year Policy Platform, a policy package that includes major policy recommendations for Taiwan in the aspects of international and cross-strait affairs, gender equality, social fairness, and economic development.

In 2012, the DPP entered the presidential election race under the leadership of Dr. Tsai Ing-wen as the party chair and the first female presidential candidate in Taiwan. Although defeated by the incumbent KMT president, the DPP was able to garner a support rate of 45.6 percent, an increase of 4.08 percent from what it had at the 2008 presidential election. Additionally, the DPP won 40 legislative seats, an increase of 13 seats from the last legislative election.

Internationally, the DPP continues to adhere to the principles of democracy, human rights, and good governance through close alliances with democratic countries around the world. The DPP is a member of Liberal International and a founding member of the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats.
Taiwan is considered to be one of Asia’s success stories – economically and politically. Economically, Taiwan, following the lead of Japan, achieved phenomenal growth rates in the immediate post-war period, making it one of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) that made Asia the fastest growing region in the world. This economic growth provided the social requisite for political development in terms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In the mid-1980s, the country transitioned from a one-party dictatorship to a democracy. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan, formed at the height of protests demanding for greater democratic space and individual freedoms, played a very significant role in the democratization process.

As the first Taiwanese-born political party and first opposition party created during the Martial Law period, DPP rallied for an end to authoritarian rule and an opening up of the political system. After Taiwan’s transition to democracy, DPP evolved into a party dedicated to ensuring social and political justice for the Taiwanese people. In 2000, the party made history when it became the first ruling party in Taiwan other than the Nationalist Party of Taiwan or Koumintang (KMT), which

In a region where political parties campaign on a platform of democracy yet remain as undemocratic, elitist and even authoritarian organizations, DPP’s general membership is king. In theory and in practice, DPP is a model of internal democracy where members, leaders and candidates are all bound by the principles of transparency and accountability, equitably participate in decision making processes and submit to the will of the majority and interests of the common good.
had ruled since 1949. After eight years in government, the DPP now serves as the country’s major opposition party (CALD, 2012).

As a political party committed to fostering democracy in the political system, it should not come as a surprise that the DPP also adopted democracy as a guiding principle in its internal party structures and procedures. Party officials at both national and local levels, for example, are either elected directly or chosen by representatives who have been elected to make the selection. More significant is the party’s use of primary elections in selecting its candidates for elections. DPP primaries involve not only party members but also the general public. This makes the procedure an interesting case in party administration and management.

The Use and Evolution of Primary System *

The primary system is a democratic procedure of choosing candidates for elections through votes of party members or of the general public. By opening up the choice of electoral candidates to party members or to the general population, this process is claimed to result in the selection of the most qualified and most competitive candidates.

The DPP selects its candidates for elections through a primary which combines party members showing up in person to cast their votes, and a telephone survey. Primaries take place when there are more contenders than the posts available, and negotiations fail to reach a consensus on who should be the party’s official candidates in the elections (Hsieh, 2012a).

Through the years, the party’s primary system evolves depending on the political situation and how the party fared in the past elections. Until 1996, candidates were chosen by direct votes of party members and by survey results. The weights of direct party votes and survey results in determining candidates were equal at 50% each, reflecting the equal importance given by the DPP on both party members’ votes and the poll result.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary Election Formula</th>
<th>Presidential Election Results (% of votes won)</th>
<th>Parliamentary Election Results (% of seats won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>50% - poll results 50% - member-based votes</td>
<td>21.13</td>
<td>29.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>70% - poll results 30% - member-based votes</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>38.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>70% - poll results 30% - member-based votes</td>
<td>50.11</td>
<td>39.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>70% - poll results 30% - member-based votes</td>
<td>41.55</td>
<td>23.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>100% - poll results*</td>
<td>45.63</td>
<td>35.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the 2000 elections, the party increased the weight of survey results in the primary to 70%. In the subsequent presidential elections, the victory of DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian, who captured 39.3% of the votes, ended the half-century rule of the KMT. The parliamentary


*In the DPP National Congress held on 15 July 2012, it was agreed in principle to resume member-based voting in future primary elections.
elections also made the DPP the biggest party in the legislature with 87 of 225 seats won. While primary election was only one of the factors which account for the DPP victory, the impression during this time was that greater involvement of the general public in choosing candidates increased the party's chances of electoral success. For this reason, the primary elections formula was retained in the 2004 elections, and the election results in both the presidential and legislative races validated its effectiveness.

In the lead-up to the 2008 elections, the weight of the survey remained 70%, but the party focused only on exclusive interviewees, or only those who previously voted for DPP were qualified as respondents. The results of the elections were not favorable to the party, having won only 27 of 113 seats after seats in the Legislative Yuan were officially reduced from 225 to 113. DPP also lost the presidency when its presidential candidate only obtained 41.55% against KMT's 58.45%.

Starting from the 2010 mayoralty elections, the DPP primary was decided 100% by public polls. This applies to all except the at-large nominees for the party list, which were decided by the nomination committee. The 2010 elections showed the DPP securing two out of the five mayoralty seats, although it enjoyed significant growth in the number of city councilors.

The most recent party primary was for the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. For the presidential nomination, Ms. Tsai Ing-wen, the party chairperson, and Mr. Su Tseng-chang, the former premier, were the two main competitors. Former DPP Chair Hsu Hsin-liang was a distant third. At the end of the primaries, Ms. Tsai won with a very slim gap.

In the 2012 presidential election, Ms. Tsai received 45.63% of the votes while Taiwan's incumbent president from KMT, Ma Ying-jeou received 51.60%. DPP, however, increased its seats to 40 in the 113-member legislature. Though the party did not win the elections, DPP still showed marked improvement in its campaigns and a significant increase in terms of the garnered votes compared to the last elections.

The Primary System: Main Characteristics, Issues and Effectiveness

For the DPP, candidate nomination is of great importance considering that their opponent, the KMT, is one of the most established and richest political parties in the world. In order to be competitive, the party needs to field in candidates that are not only qualified but also have the support of the broadest segment of the Taiwanese people. It is for this reason that the DPP adopts a primary system with varying configurations of incorporating levels of popular support.

As noted above, primaries are called when negotiations amongst potential contenders fail to arrive at a decision on who should be the party's official candidates. In practice, they commonly take place in candidate nominations for president, national legislators and mayors. In other posts, particularly at the local level, negotiations amongst the aspirants usually result in a consensus (Hsieh, 2012a).

The DPP's primary process, as exemplified in the last presidential nomination, typically includes the following stages:

- **Formation of primary elections committee.** The Central Executive Committee (CEC) or the Central Standing Committee (CSC) constitutes the primary elections committee, headed by the Secretary General, and whose members include some CSC members, representatives of factions, and opinion leaders from outside the party. This committee sorts out the nomination quota, timeline and all the other details of the nominations. DPP’s Department of Organizational Development acts as the secretariat for the primary elections.

- **Registration of candidates.** All those interested to gain the party's official nomination were required to submit documents indicating their desire to be nominated, as well as a fee/deposit, part of which was returned to the candidate who decided to terminate his/her campaign.
• **Television presentation of candidates.** After the list of candidates was finalized, television debates were arranged where the candidates outlined their vision and responded to questions from experts and the general public. DPP candidates were not usually pitted against each other in a debate – they were only asked to make a presentation and respond to questions or comments during the open forum.

• **Surveys.** The DPP Survey Department and/or commissioned polling companies conducted the actual survey. The survey questionnaire had to be agreed upon by all candidates participating in the primary.

For the 2012 presidential nomination, polling was done through telephone interviews by five polling companies. Each company completed 3,000 successful samples chosen from about 4 million telephone numbers which are at least a year old.

Opinion polls were conducted through "contrast style polling", where the DPP candidates were pitted individually with the nominee of the opponent party, the KMT. If the interviewee preferred all the DPP candidates over the opponent’s nominee, the response of the interviewee would not be counted. Candidate who scored higher (or highest if two or more DPP candidates defeated the KMT nominee) than the opponent would be the winner. If no DPP candidate scored higher than the opponent, the candidate with the highest rating would be nominated. In the event of a tie, the winner would be the person who either defeated the nominee of the opponent party by the most or who trailed him/her the least (DPP, 2011).

• **Announcement of results.** After the polling was done, the winner of the poll was announced as the party's nominee in the elections.
In previous primary elections, when party members were given a voice in the process, DPP's county branches were responsible for the logistics of the primary elections. There was usually one precinct for every one to three town/s all over the country. In some remote areas, there was at least one booth per town. A party member had to be in good standing (i.e. regularly pays party dues, not convicted of any violation of party rules) to be eligible to participate in the primary elections (Hsieh, 2012a).

Since the most recent elections were the first time that DPP relied solely on survey results in choosing its candidate for President, how the surveys were conducted became a subject of great scrutiny. The first issue pertains to the cancellation of votes of those who prefer DPP candidates over the nominee of the opponent party. This, some critics claimed, is prone to manipulation of supporters of specific DPP candidates and also of the opponent party. In the last presidential elections, for example, there were allegations that supporters of Ms. Tsai were told to only vote for her in the polls, and tell the pollster that they prefer the opponent's nominee when asked about the other two DPP candidates. There were also claims that supporters of the opponent party skewed the results by deliberately supporting the weaker DPP candidate when polled (Chao, 2011). The second issue relates to the claim that such form of polling benefits moderate swing voters and not core party supporters. This is based on the assumption that letting swing voters choose the party nominee would increase DPP's chances of winning the general election. The process, however, may alienate the party's core or grassroot supporters who may feel they are not given much importance by such a process (Batto, 2011). The third issue pertains to polling's tendency to be populist, where the candidates cater to issue-positions which are popular but may not be in line with the party's platform (Hsieh, 2012b).

Despite these issues, the use of survey polling in choosing the party's nominee appears to increase chances of electoral success. While what should be its relative weight is still debatable, the case of the DPP showed that the process enabled it to have strong showings, if not outright electoral success, in the previous elections.
In summary, the use of polling in selecting nominees for elections results in the following benefits:

- **Electoral success.** Polling will most likely result in the selection of the most qualified and winnable nominee by including in the electoral calculation the strength of the opponent, the competition amongst the candidates as well as the potential support of the swing voters.

- **Reduction of internal party politics.** By taking into consideration the poll results, the process would be less depoliticized and reduce, if not totally eliminate internal party squabbling on nomination.

- **Greater party credibility.** By involving the general public in one of its most important functions, a party gains more credibility by claiming that it not only preaches democracy in the broader political system, but also observes the principle in its own internal party structures and processes. This increased credibility, in turn, can result in greater electoral success.

- **Party accountability.** A party that has embodied democratic principles in its structures and processes is also expected to practice these principles once it enters the government.

**Conclusion**

DPP’s inclusion of survey results, in its different configurations, in choosing its electoral nominees has produced qualified successes. While the procedure did not always result in electoral victory, it arguably produced qualified contenders who posted strong showings in the actual elections. It also increased the democratic profile of the DPP as a party that truly practices what it preaches.

Despite these, other parties which intend to adopt polling as a mechanism should consider the following issues:

- **The technical and financial requirements of polling**
  
  Polling requires money and expertise. In the case of the DPP, the cost of the survey is covered by the budget of the DPP Survey Department, as well as the deposit of the fees paid by competing aspirants. When the party itself conducts the survey, it utilizes its own call centre with 40-line telephones operated by trained staff members. The staff training programme covers political knowledge, languages, communication skills, among others. The staff are also taught the computer programme where data can be stored and tabulated. Experienced statisticians then analyse the raw data and interpret the results.

- **The political culture of the party**
  
  Primary elections entail a mature political party culture. The results of the primary election should be accepted and respected by all concerned parties, otherwise, this might result in factionalism and even break-up of the party (Hsieh, 2012a).

- **The relative weight of polling vis-à-vis party members’ vote**
  
  It appears that by-and-large, the DPP achieved greater success when its primary elections were a combination of polling and party members’ vote. By combining both elements, the party can avoid alienation of its core supporters and populism.

- **The fairness of polling methodology**
  
  The polling methodology (use of telephones, commissioning outside polling companies, the contents of the questionnaire, conduct of the interview, among others) should be thoroughly
discussed and analyzed for fairness and for contextual applicability. More importantly, all parties must agree with the final methodology, otherwise, this can also be a recipe for conflict and division.

by Celito Arlegue, CALD Executive Director

COUNTRY PROFILE
Thailand

Population: 67,089,500 (July 2010)

Government Structure

Chief of State: King BHUMIBOL Adulyadej
Head of Government: Prime Minister YINGLUCK Shinawatra
Assembly: Thailand has a bicameral National Assembly (Rathasapha) consisting of the Senate (Wuthisapha) with 150 seats and the House of Representatives (Sapha Phuthaen Ratsadon) with 500 seats.

Electoral System

The King is the hereditary head of state.
The Prime Minister is appointed by the monarch to serve a 4-year term.
In the Senate (Wuthisapha), 74 members are appointed and 76 members are elected by single non-transferable vote (SNTV). In the House of Representatives (Sapha Phuthaen Ratsadon), 375 members are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve 4-year terms and 125 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms.

Future elections

Legislative - March 2014

Past elections

Parliamentary

April 2, 2006 (First Round) | April 19, 2006 | April 23, 2006 (Second Round)
February 6, 2005 | January 6, 2001 | March 4, 2000

Referendum

August 19, 2007

***From the International Foundation for Electoral Systems Election Guide [http://electionguide.org/].

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Hsieh, H. (2012a). Email Correspondence. 5 July.
The Democrat Party (DP), founded in 1946, is the oldest political party in Thailand, and is considered one of the oldest in Southeast Asia as well. Since its inception over 60 years ago, the DP has held ideologies that are opposed to all forms of dictatorship and which are instead committed to the promotion of democracy for the people, and most importantly, by the people. The survival and existence of the DP has not come easily. The party has had to go through many political struggles throughout its history, which can be divided into four periods:

- 1st Period (1946-1967) - Party Building, Pro-Democracy, and Anti-Dictatorship
- 2nd Period (1968-1979) - Party Rehabilitation and Democracy Promotion
- 3rd Period (1979-1990) - Policy Improvement and Participation in National Administration
- 4th Period (1991-Present) - Leading Party of Opposition and of Coalition Government

Throughout its history, the DP has always stood firm on the principles of democracy, freedom, transparency, accountability, and public participation. These principles, stipulated in the Party Guidelines, have guided the Party in the past six decades, and will continue to guide it for many years and generations to come.

Under the leadership and guidance of Abhisit Vejjajiva and the Executive Committee, the DP aims to provide the Thai public with a viable, responsible political alternative to the populist political environment that has been permeating the Thai atmosphere since 2001. Through various schemes and measures implemented since 2008, especially the People’s Agenda, the Party has been able to steer national development toward a new direction. It uses the idea of “policy for the people by the people,” which highlights the point that “People must come first.” The Party has assured the inclusiveness of its socio-economic policy and measures. Programs such as 15 years of free education, income-guarantee initiative for farming population, debt relief and access to micro-credits, and social and health security scheme have been launched.
In Thailand’s latest parliamentary elections in July 2011, a small group of noticeably young candidates from the Democrat Party (DP) were sworn into parliament. They are now some of the youngest legislators of the kingdom. The wave of newer and fresher faces may be familiar in the political landscapes of Europe, North America and Australia, but not in a country like Thailand. Firstly, polls suggest that nearly 90% of the Thai youths view politics with either disdain or indifference. Secondly, youth wings are generally not present in Thai political parties.

The DP has long realized the potential of youth in politics. It is the only political party in Thailand which gives emphasis to developing and engaging the youth through its programs collectively called Young Democrat.

Participants in the Rak-D Camps, Democrat Internship Programs and Future Thai Leaders range from high school students to young candidates for parliament and have attracted young liberals whose active engagements in youth in politics have resulted in a significant increase of young candidates for parliamentary elections.

It is not enough for the ancient kingdom’s oldest political party to reach to young voters, it has instituted reforms and programs with the purpose of having as many young candidates as possible in the local and national levels, thus, reaping a harvest of new talents, new ideas and renewed vigor not just for the party but for the country that has been rocked by recent political turmoil.

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The forward-looking Young Democrat programs inculcate among Thai youths liberal and democratic values and attitudes thus giving them opportunities to grow and become extraordinary leaders in government.

**Young Democrat: Pioneering a Practicum in Politics**

In the past, it was difficult to convince young people to get involved in party work in Thailand unless they were recommended by or related to senior party members and officials. Understandably, the DP found only a limited pool of talented young people willing to work for the party. Most of those interested graduated from overseas who have little experience in dealing with local and rural communities. This spurred the DP to identify, recruit and train potential young leaders who can even become future MPs, and this initiative later evolved into three separate programs collectively known as the Young Democrat programs: the Democrat Internship Program (2006), Future Thai Leaders (2011), and Rak-D Camp (2012).

Under Abhisit Vejjajiva’s leadership, one of the kingdom’s youngest Prime Ministers in history, youths have been given more important roles especially with regard to the Future Thai Leaders program. The Future Thai Leaders program welcomes and actively seeks young Thais, especially those without familial or social ties to the DP to get involved in party work and internalize the belief that politics affects the daily lives of the Thai people; hence, there is a need for them to participate as key stakeholders in nation-building. Designed to identify and recruit young people from 25 to 35 years old, the Young Democrats fit into one of these three categories: future parliamentary candidates, members of policy and research teams, or campaigners for candidates.

The screening process of the Future Thai Leaders, as well as the two other programs, is quite similar. The DP scouts for candidates who exhibit passion for and interest in politics. Candidates usually have to answer short essay questions and go through an interview before being admitted to a particular program.
As part of trying to make Young Democrat programs more accessible to interested youths, the party uses social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to reach potential candidates. Consequently, traditional media print news about the programs while social media sites are the primary sources of information.

Given the overwhelming response, a screening process similar to a university admission was made. A second screening via phone interviews was conducted for the final selection. Two hundred young liberals attended the first (and as of this writing, the only) Future Thai Leaders program in February 2011. Now over 500 youths have participated in different programs. The party has been organizing five-day Rak-D Camps (roughly translated to “Goodwill Camp”) all over the country. A thousand youths from over 20 provinces are expected to attend the camps organized in their hometowns. The next step, Democrat Internship Program (DIP), is designed to be a young politician’s introduction into politics by giving the interns responsibilities in campaigns, projects, and day-to-day activities of the party. DIP runs for at least three weeks to a month, targeting university to graduate students.

Lectures, hands-on workshops, and field trips are the key components of these programs. Members of parliament or even cabinet members serve as speakers and resource persons. Specific activities include political marketing in Thailand lectures, public opinion polling workshops, and field trips that highlight self-sufficiency in the economy.

Alumni of various programs have later become party officers, staff of DP MPs or even MP candidates and MPs themselves. In the last election of 2011, the party was able to field ten candidates from the ranks of the Young Democrats. Four out of the ten candidates had successful campaigns and now serve as MPs. As for the six other young candidates who lost, although a few left the party, the rest continue to remain with DP as volunteers or as parliamentary staff, and they are likely to be nominated again as candidates in future election.

### SUMMARY OF THE DEMOCRAT PARTY’S YOUNG DEMOCRAT AND ITS THREE FLAGSHIP PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rak D Camp (Good Will Camp)</td>
<td>high school students</td>
<td>5-day camps focusing on political communication and basic knowledge of Thai politics. Newly launched in 2012, camps are already organized in many provinces all over the country. Aims to raise awareness of DPs programs and ideals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Internship Program (DIP)</td>
<td>18-25 years old</td>
<td>3-to-4-week intensive internship program. 13 batches (average of 50 participants) to date. Lectures/seminars led by party leaders/MPs. Field works e.g. going on study trips, conducting opinion polls and building political campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Thai Leaders (FTL)</td>
<td>25-35 years old</td>
<td>8-weekend intensive program. 1 batch to date (February 2011). 2011 batch size: around 200 candidates from 500 applicants. Comprising of lectures/seminars led by party leaders/MPs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most participants in these programs are ineligible to run for parliament since they are under 25 years of age which is the minimum age requirement for a Thai MP. A number of Young Democrat alumni who wish to run for office but are under-aged have become assistants to members of parliament, junior party officers, and volunteer program organizers until such time they become eligible. Some party officers take in young candidates as staff considering their rich potential and their relatively more positive attitude with new ideas and practices. This mechanism provides mutual benefits. Young candidates can learn substantially from the more experienced ones while the senior members benefit from the energy, enthusiasm and dynamism of the young.

The DP realizes the potential of new social media in reaching out to younger generations. All party leaders now have their own social media teams and most party MPs use Facebook and other social media sites to reach their constituencies and beyond. Many even personally write their own tweets and responses.

Currently the program has two categories: one for regular students in Thai universities and another for students enrolled abroad or in international programs in Thai universities. The party will be piloting a four-week program instead of three-week program to integrate the two types of participants. Politicians from other political parties will also be invited to give participants a wider perspective on Thai politics.

**Conclusion**

According to party members, the Young Democrat programs are very successful. In addition, the referral rate and word of mouth advertising are very high.

Of the four Future Thai Leaders political candidates who won, one was even from the northeast province, which is a known bailiwick of the current ruling party. The program also attracted over five hundred youths to submit applications. Furthermore, Future Thai Leaders could set a precedent for the prioritization of youth in other political parties in Thailand and the rest of Asia.

After Future Thai Leaders, some attendees made a few suggestions including programs outside Bangkok to reach out to youths in rural areas; greater communication within the party; more programs for both new and returning participants; additional activities including more engagements with DP leaders and politicians; increased and more systematic participation by participants and alumni in electoral campaigns; and alumni groups and projects to stay connected. Party officers and members have been receptive to these suggestions by sustaining communication and even hiring youth coordinators within the party.

The DP intends to finally establish a youth wing and will incorporate the programs of Young Democrat within the organization. Institutionalizing Young Democrat into a youth wing will bring continuity and greater communication and cooperation within and among alumni groups.

For Rak-D Camp, the DP is planning to organize in 20 provinces in 2012. The following year, 40 other provinces will be covered or a total of 60 out of Thailand’s 77 provinces. This will substantially increase accessibility to and participation in all Young Democrat programs. If participants find the five-day camp enriching and interesting, they can apply for a more intensive Democrat Internship Program.

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**References**

Dusadeeisariyakul, P. (2012). Email Correspondence. 1 August.

The Council for Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD) was inaugurated in Bangkok in 1993, with the support of then Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and South Korea’s Kim Dae-Jung. CALD, which offers a unique platform for dialogue and cooperation, is the only regional alliance of liberal and democratic political parties in Asia.


The other members of CALD are the Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (PGRM), the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), and the Civil Will Party (CWP) of Mongolia. The Liberal Forum Pakistan (LFP) is an associate member while the Hong Kong legislators Martin Lee and Sin Chung-kai are individual members. In 2010, CALD bestowed honorary individual membership to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Through CALD, political parties, groups, and individuals have a continuing discussion on the developments occurring in the various countries of the region. The aim is to assess the possibilities for liberal solutions to problems facing Asian democracies.

Accordingly, CALD organizes network meetings including those with its partners (Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Liberal International, Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Alliance of Democrats, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs), international conferences on vital issues affecting the region, and regular workshops on communication, political management, and women in politics. It also sends missions for various advocacies, sponsors internship programs in its secretariat and in the European Parliament, as well as maintains a website, a social network group account and a weekly electronic newsletter.

APPENDIX I

About CALD

The Council for Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD) was inaugurated in Bangkok in 1993, with the support of then Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and South Korea’s Kim Dae-Jung. CALD, which offers a unique platform for dialogue and cooperation, is the only regional alliance of liberal and democratic political parties in Asia.


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### APPENDIX II

**Basic Information: Countries with CALD Member Parties***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>CAMBODIA</th>
<th>MALAYSIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL SYSTEM</strong></td>
<td>Constitutional Monarchy</td>
<td>Federal Constitutional Monarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXECUTIVE</strong></td>
<td>King&lt;br&gt;Prime Minister&lt;br&gt;Permanent Deputy Prime Minister&lt;br&gt;Deputy Prime Ministers</td>
<td>King (Yang di-Pertuan Agong)&lt;br&gt;Prime Minister&lt;br&gt;Deputy Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEGISLATIVE</strong></td>
<td>1. Senate or Protsapheya (61 seats): 57 elected by functional constituencies (commune councils), 2 appointed by King, 2 elected by National Assembly&lt;br&gt;2. National Assembly or Radhsphea (123 seats): elected by proportional representation</td>
<td>1. Senate or Dewan Negara (70 seats): 44 appointed by the King, 26 elected by state legislative assemblies&lt;br&gt;2. House of Representative or Dewan Rakyat (222 seats): elected by district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JUDICIAL</strong></td>
<td>Supreme Council of the Magistracy&lt;br&gt;Supreme Court</td>
<td>Federal Court&lt;br&gt;Court of Appeal&lt;br&gt;High Courts of Malaya and Sabah and Sarawak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOCAL GOVERNMENTS/ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS</strong></td>
<td>23 Provinces, 1 Municipality&lt;br&gt;185 Districts&lt;br&gt;1,621 Communes</td>
<td>13 States, 1 Federal Territory&lt;br&gt;Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELECTORAL SYSTEM/SCHEDULE</strong></td>
<td>Prime Minister: Indirectly Elected&lt;br&gt;Senate: Proportional Representation/Every 6 years (next: 2012)&lt;br&gt;National Assembly: Proportional Representation/Every 5 years (next 2013)</td>
<td>Prime Minister: Indirectly Elected&lt;br&gt;Senate: Indirectly Elected&lt;br&gt;House of Representatives: First Pass The Post/Every 5 years (next:2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These matrices only indicate countries of CALD Member Parties included in this volume.*
## APPENDIX II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
<th>SINGAPORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL SYSTEM</strong></td>
<td>Presidential Republic</td>
<td>Parliamentary Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXECUTIVE</strong></td>
<td>President&lt;br&gt;Vice President</td>
<td>Prime Minister&lt;br&gt;Deputy Prime Ministers&lt;br&gt;Senior Minister&lt;br&gt;President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEGISLATIVE</strong></td>
<td>1. Senate or Senado (24 seats): elected nationally&lt;br&gt;2. House of Representatives or Kapulungan ng mga Kinatawan (284 seats): 228 elected by district, 56 elected by sectoral party-list</td>
<td>Parliament (99 seats): 87 elected by constituency, 3 Non-Constituency MPs appointed by opposition parties, 9 Nominated MPs appointed by the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JUDICIAL</strong></td>
<td>Supreme Court&lt;br&gt;Court of Appeals</td>
<td>Supreme Court&lt;br&gt;Court of Appeals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOCAL GOVERNMENTS/ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS</strong></td>
<td>17 Regions&lt;br&gt;80 Provinces&lt;br&gt;138 Cities, 1,496 Municipalities&lt;br&gt;42,027 Barangays</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELECTORAL SYSTEM/SCHEDULE</strong></td>
<td>President: First Pass The Post/Every 6 years (next: 2016)&lt;br&gt;Senate: First Pass The Post/Every 6 years, half voted every 3 years (next: 2013/2016)&lt;br&gt;House of Representatives: First Pass The Post and Proportional Representation/Every 3 years (next: 2013)</td>
<td>Prime Minister: Appointed by President&lt;br&gt;President: First Pass The Post/Every 6 years (next: 2017)&lt;br&gt;Parliament: First Pass The Post/Every 5 years (next 2016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX II

### COUNTRY: TAIWAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL SYSTEM</th>
<th>(Semi-Presidential) Multiparty Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGISLATIVE</td>
<td>Legislative Yuan (113 seats):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73 elected by district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34 elected by at large and overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compatriots members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 elected from aborigines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUDICIAL</td>
<td>Judicial Yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL GOVERNMENTS/ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS</td>
<td>2 Provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Special Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 Counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Provincial Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTORAL SYSTEM/SCHEDULE</td>
<td>President: First Pass The Post/Every 4 years (next: 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Premier: Appointed by President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative Yuan: Proportional Representation, Alternative Vote and Single Non-transferable Vote/Every 4 years (next: 2016)</td>
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### COUNTRY: THAILAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL SYSTEM</th>
<th>Constitutional Monarchy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE</td>
<td>King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Prime Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGISLATIVE</td>
<td>1. Senate or Wutthisapha (150 seats):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76 elected by province, 74 appointed by judges and independent government bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. House of Representatives or Ratsadon (500 seats):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>375 elected by district, 125 elected by proportional representation by party-list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUDICIAL</td>
<td>Constitutional Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supreme Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL GOVERNMENTS/ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS</td>
<td>76 Provinces, 1 Special Administrative Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>878 Districts (+50 in Bangkok)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,255 Subdistricts (+169 in Bangkok)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTORAL SYSTEM/SCHEDULE</td>
<td>Prime Minister: Indirectly Elected from House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate: First Pass The Post/Every 6 years (next: 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House of Representatives: First Pass The Post and Proportional Representation/Every 4 years (next: 2015)</td>
</tr>
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# Basic Information: CALD Member Parties*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALD MEMBER PARTY</th>
<th>SAM RAINSY PARTY, CAMBODIA</th>
<th>PARTI GERAKAN RAKYAT MALAYSIA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YEAR FOUNDED</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT STATUS/STANDING</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Junior Member in Government Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHEST RANKING PARTY OFFICIAL</td>
<td>Sam Rainsy, President</td>
<td>Koh Tsu Koon, President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHEST RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL</td>
<td>MPs in National Assembly</td>
<td>Koh Tsu Koon, Minister in the Malaysian Prime Minister’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAST HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>NO. OF SEATS IN NAT’L LEGISLATURE</td>
<td>26 in National Assembly (21.14%) 11 in Senate (18.97%)</td>
<td>2 in House of Representatives (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUES</td>
<td>Land Grabbing, Poverty Alleviation, Border Conflicts, Political Persecution</td>
<td>Government Reform, Ethnic/Religious Fundamentalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These matrices only indicate CALD Member Parties included in this volume.
### APPENDIX III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALD MEMBER PARTY</th>
<th>LIBERAL PARTY, PHILIPPINES</th>
<th>SINGAPORE DEMOCRATIC PARTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YEAR FOUNDED</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT STATUS/STANDING</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHEST RANKING PARTY OFFICIAL</td>
<td>Benigno Aquino III, Chairman Joseph Emilio Abaya, Acting President</td>
<td>Jufrie Mahmood, Chairman Chee Soon Juan, Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHEST RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL</td>
<td>Benigno Aquino III, President</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO. OF SEATS IN NAT’L LEGISLATURE</td>
<td>4 in Senate (16.67%) 86 House of Representatives (30.07%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUES</td>
<td>Poverty Alleviation, Corruption</td>
<td>Democracy, Human Rights, Rule of Law, Political Persecution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALD MEMBER PARTY</td>
<td>DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY, TAIWAN</td>
<td>CALD MEMBER PARTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEAR FOUNDED</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>YEAR FOUNDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT STATUS/STANDING</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>CURRENT STATUS/STANDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHEST RANKING PARTY OFFICIAL</td>
<td>Su Tseng-chang, Chairperson Su Chia-chyuan, Secretary-General</td>
<td>HIGHEST RANKING PARTY OFFICIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHEST RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL</td>
<td>MPs in the Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>HIGHEST RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO. OF SEATS IN NAT’L LEGISLATURE</td>
<td>40 in Legislative Yuan (35.40%)</td>
<td>NO. OF SEATS IN NAT’L LEGISLATURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUES</td>
<td>Sovereignty, Economic Relations with China</td>
<td>ISSUES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>