

# BEYOND FACT CHECKS: MEDIA SYSTEM REFORMS FOR DISINFORMATION RESILIENCE


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# Disinformation is deliberate

- “Any false information that is intentionally published to harm a person, community, or an entire society” (Arguelles & Lanuza 2021)
- Harmful to both individual/group targets and entire society
  - Violence against communities
  - Hijacks public conversations
  - Erodes trust in media

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


Figure credit: ARGUELLES & LANUZA 2021







# Media system approach to disinformation

- Contra “bad apples” approach
- “Entirety of rules, norms, and institutions that regulates the relationship between media, state, and the broader public in a given state” (Arguelles & Lanuza 2021)
- Media system features may facilitate or inhibit disinformation



MODEL	STATES	FEATURES			
		Media regulation	Media ownership	Political parallelism	Media freedom
<b>Government mouthpiece</b>	Brunei, Laos, Vietnam	Tight state regulation	State monopoly	High— mostly state press	Unfree
<b>Limited public informant</b>	Cambodia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand	Tight state regulation	Mixed	High— generally partisan press	Unfree
<b>Public watchdogs</b>	Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Timor-Leste	Media self-regulation	Private ownership	Low— mainly commercial press	Partly free



Media system	Actors	Form	Disinformation vulnerability
<b>Government mouthpiece</b> (Brunei, Laos, Vietnam)	Mainly state actors; partisan and commercial actors	Mostly crude	High vulnerability to state-backed disinformation across platforms
<b>Limited public informant</b> (Cambodia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand)	Both state and non-state actors	Uneven mix of crude and sophisticated	Platform-dependent
<b>Public watchdog</b> (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Timor Leste)	Both state and non-state actors	Mostly sophisticated	High vulnerability to both state and non-state backed disinformation across platforms, but especially digital media



# Developing disinformation resilience

- Varied media system features make societies more vulnerable to some forms of disinformation over others
- Developing disinformation resilience requires appropriate responses to specific disinformation vulnerability of a particular media system



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Common policy responses	Government mouthpiece	Limited public informant	Public watchdog
<b>State-led content regulation</b> (i.e. anti-fake news laws, censorship)	May reinforce state capture of media	May strengthen state control of media	May be ineffective due to weak regulatory apparatus
<b>Mainstreaming disinformation literacy</b> (i.e. how to spot fake news, fact-checks)	Ineffective in low-choice media environments	Platform-dependent	Ineffective against sophisticated disinformation
<b>Tech firm-led content regulation</b> (i.e. content takedowns, shutting down pages)	May “balkanize” media system, may strengthen state influence on Big Tech		May reinforce Big Tech monopoly of media





# *MARAMING SALAMAT.*

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