

What Can Political Science Say to Politicians?: Trends from Academia

Elvin Ong

Assistant Professor of Political Science, National University of Singapore
Chair, Association for Asian Studies Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Studies Group

August 2024

Democratic Backsliding

What it is:

- “The state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy.”


ON DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

Nancy Bermeo

Nancy Bermeo is the Nuffield Chair of Comparative Politics at Oxford University and PIIRS Senior Scholar at Princeton University. Her most recent book (coedited with Deborah Yashar) is titled Parties, Movements and Democracy in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Scholars have devoted huge amounts of attention to explaining why democracies break down, but systematic and explicitly comparative work on precisely *how* they break down has been less common. Political scientists have focused more often on economic and institutional correlates than on choices and choosers, even though these may be more amenable to direct influence and rapid intervention.

What kinds of concrete actions transform a regime from one type to another? Which techniques of transformation are most common? Analyzing what has come to be known as *democratic backsliding* moves us toward answers to these questions, for it forces us to focus on the actual choices that change regimes.



Comment and Controversy

Measuring Democratic Backsliding

Andrew T. Little, *University of California, Berkeley, USA*

Anne Meng, *University of Virginia, USA*

ABSTRACT Despite the general narrative that the world is in a period of democratic decline, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies that assess whether this is systematically true. Most existing studies of global backsliding are based largely if not entirely on subjective indicators that rely on expert coder judgment. Our study surveys objective indicators of democracy (e.g., incumbent performance in elections) and finds little evidence of global democratic decline during the past decade. To explain the discrepancy in trends between expert-coded and objective indicators, we consider the role of coder bias and leaders strategically using more subtle undemocratic action. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the world is becoming less democratic exclusively in ways that require subjective judgment to detect, this claim is not justified by existing evidence.

Democratic Backsliding

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The image shows a screenshot of a BBC news article. At the top, the BBC logo is visible. Below it, a navigation bar includes links for Home, News, Sport, Business, Innovation, Culture, Travel, Earth, Video, and Live. The main headline reads "'Electoral autocracy': The downgrading of India's democracy". Below the headline, the date "16 March 2021" and a "Share" icon are present. The author's name, "Soutik Biswas", and his title, "India correspondent", are listed. The main image of the article depicts a large crowd of people, many wearing white kurtas and turbans, holding Indian national flags.



The image shows a screenshot of a book review article from the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). The header includes the ECPS logo and the text "EUROPEAN CENTER for POPULISM STUDIES". Navigation links for MONITOR, PROGRAMS, JOURNALS, and PUBLICATIONS are visible. The main headline is "The Philippines: From 'People Power' to Democratic Backsliding". Below the headline, the date "June 14, 2023" is shown. The main image features former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in a white shirt, holding a Galil sniper rifle, standing next to outgoing Philippine National Police (PNP) chief Ronald dela Rosa in a dark blue uniform. The caption below the image reads: "Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte holds a Galil sniper rifle with outgoing Philippine National Police (PNP) chief Ronald dela Rosa (L) at Camp Crame in Manila on April 19, 2018. Photo: Salma Bashir Motiwala." At the bottom, the author's name and publication details are provided: "Kenes, Bulent. (2023). 'The Philippines: From 'People Power' to Democratic Backsliding.' ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. June 14, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.55271/br0014>".

Executive Aggrandizement

What it is:

- “Elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences.”

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<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1851203>

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RESEARCH ARTICLES 

Democratic regression in Asia: introduction

Aurel Croissant^a and Jeffrey Haynes^b

^aInstitute of Political Science, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany; ^bLondon University, London, UK

ABSTRACT

Given Asia-Pacific’s diversity and the large variance of potentially relevant factors, the region presents social scientists with a natural laboratory for competing theories of democratic erosion, decay and revival and to identify patterns and relationships. This introductory article offers a brief review of relevant literature and introduces the different categories of analysis that an analytical framework considered in various forms in the special issue. This article discusses the reasons for the renewed pessimism in democratization studies and provides a survey of different conceptualizations to capture forms of democratic regression and the autocratization of which the contributors to this special issue adhere. We discuss how Asian experiences fit into the debate about democracy’s deepening global recession and examine assumptions about the causes, catalysts and consequences of democratic regression and resilience in the comparative politics literature. Finally, the remaining twelve articles of this special issue will be introduced.

The Institutional Roots of Democratic Backsliding

Jennifer Gandhi, Emory University

Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy. By Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.


Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites and Regime Change. By Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.



How Democracies Die. By Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. New York: Crown, 2018.

of its workability” (30). Yet almost 40 years later, many people seem unsure of this proposition, not only in places where democracy’s hold was doubtful from the beginning but also in countries where people, in some sense, take democracy for granted. In their recent annual report, the Varieties of Democracy project finds that for the first time since the third wave transitions, the number of countries experiencing advances in democratization is matched by an equal number of states undergoing democratic backsliding, and most of the declines in the quality are occurring in the oldest democracies (Lührmann, Mechkova, and Lindberg 2018).

Perhaps it is consistent with these times, then, that all three of these books implant the idea that all is not well with

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 OPEN ACCESS 

Erosion or decay? Conceptualizing causes and mechanisms of democratic regression

...s Gerschewski^{a,b}

...n Social Science Center, Research Unit: Global Governance, Berlin, Germany; ^bFreie Universität Berlin, Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS)”, Berlin,

ABSTRACT

Democratic regression has become a worrying phenomenon in the last years. Social science has provided a variety of explanations why democratic regimes have lost their regime quality. Against this backdrop, I take stock of the recent literature by putting forward two important analytical distinctions that we should make more explicit. First, I propose to classify our current explanations along the dimension where the cause for the malaise originated. By doing so, I introduce a distinction between erosion and decay type of arguments. While the former is a gradual process that is caused exogenously – like wind or water hitting a stone – the latter is caused endogenously – like the half-life in nuclear decay processes. Second, I draw a distinction between the endogenous or exogenous roots of the phenomenon and the subsequent causal mechanism that connects the cause with the effect. I outline the need for dissecting a causal mechanism into its constitutive elements and highlight its underlying dimensions of temporality. Throughout the article, I use empirical case material as well as relevant secondary literature to illustrate these points.

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In Troubled Waters: South Korea's Democracy in Crisis

Just as the United States experienced a crisis of democracy under the Trump administration, South Korea underwent a democratic recession during President Moon Jae-in's time in office. The consequences of this decline have been evident throughout the election and the subsequent presidential transition.

Gi-Wook Shin f x in e



President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol speaks during a press conference on March 20, 2022 in Seoul, South Korea. Yoon announced his decision to move the presidential office to the defense ministry compound in Seoul's central district of Yongsan immediately after his inauguration on May 10. Jung Yeon-Je/ Getty Images

This essay originally appeared in Korean in the *May 2022 issue of Sindonga* (New East Asia), Korea's oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as the first in a monthly column, "*Shin's Reflections on Korea*." Translated by Raymond Ha. A [PDF version of this essay](#) is also available to download.

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ONLINE EXCLUSIVE

Why Indonesia's Democracy Is in Danger

SHARE f t in e



Indonesian voters have made Prabowo Subianto, a special-forces commander with a dark past, their next president. Even as voters flocked to the polls, his election is a harbinger of democracy's decline.

By Thomas B. Pepinsky

February 2024

Voting Against Disorder

What it is:

- “Candidates and elected officials promoting not law *and* order, but rather order *over* law, and seeking legitimation for this program at the ballot box.”

SOUTHEAST ASIA: VOTING AGAINST DISORDER

Thomas Pepinsky

Thomas Pepinsky is associate professor of government at Cornell University and associate director of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. He is coauthor (with R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani) of Piety and Public Opinion: Understanding Indonesian Islam (forthcoming), and author of Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective (2009).

Since his election to the presidency of the Philippines in May 2016, Rodrigo Duterte has brought his country’s politics into the international spotlight. He had risen to national prominence on his record as a crime-fighter while serving as mayor of Davao City on the large southern island of Mindanao between 2013 and 2016. As mayor, he had worked with alleged death squads, and he has been famously unapologetic about his aggressive and misogynistic rhetoric. Nicknamed “the Punisher,” he stood out among presidential candidates by vocally insisting that he was ready—even eager—to use violence and strong-arm tactics in the quest to solve social and political problems. He has governed just as he had promised: In less than a year, thousands of real and suspected drug dealers and users have been killed.

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
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Even within democratic polities, preoccupations with disorder so strong that they threaten the rule of law have proven capable of reshaping electoral platforms. The success of order-first political strategies reflects elite and middle-class frustrations with unstable and ineffective governance, combined with a historically rooted belief that political stability and material progress require the elimination of disorderly elements. These strategies have become prominent across an array of disparate political environments in Southeast Asia, and in all cases co-exist uneasily with the democratic settings in which they have recently taken hold.

Voting Against Disorder

What it is:

- “Candidates and elected officials promoting not law *and* order, but rather order *over* law, and seeking legitimation for this program at the ballot box.”



Those of you who are just embarking on the study of the law will learn the phrase “law and order”. In a settled and established society, law appears to be a precursor of order. Good laws lead to good order, that is the form that you will learn. But the hard realities of keeping the peace between man and man and

LKY/1962/LKY0118.DOC

7

between authority and the individual can be more accurately described if the phrase were inverted to “order and law”, for without order the operation of law is impossible. Order having been established and the rules having become enforceable in a settled society, only then, is it possible to work out human relationships between subject and subject, and subject and the State in accordance with predetermined rules of law.

Tradeoffs

What it is:

- When people are forced to make a choice between two things, both of which have their benefits and costs, upsides and downsides.

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- When people are forced to make a choice between two things, both of which have their benefits and costs, upsides and downsides.
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Tradeoffs

What it is:

- When people are forced to make a choice between two things, both of which have their benefits and costs, upsides and downsides.
- How would people choose if forced to make a choice between order and authoritarianism, versus disorder and democracy?

The appeal of electoral autocracy: Assessing citizens' revealed societal preferences*

Anja Neundorff^{a†}, Sirianne Dahlum^b, Kristian Vrede Skaaning Frederiksen^c,
and Aykut Öztürk^a

^a University of Glasgow, ^b University of Oslo, and ^c Aarhus University

March 5, 2024

Abstract

Are citizens willing to trade democratic institutions and practices for more authoritarian alternatives? If so, what do they prioritize and why? We investigate this experimentally by exposing over 35,000 respondents from 32 different countries – both democracies and autocracies – to a series of hypothetical countries, asking them to choose the country they would prefer to live in. We vary the following attributes of the countries: the presence of (various) democratic practices, cultural-social characteristics, and economic and physical security. Based on this, we investigate expectations on how citizens may trade democracy against economic and physical security. We find that citizens are highly committed to free and fair elections. However, many citizens are willing to trade executive constraints to gain economic prosperity. These results are mostly uniform across various country- and individual-specific characteristics. Hence, citizens appear to value what the typical electoral autocrat claims to provide: elected leaders and (economic) safety.

Keywords: Democracy; authoritarian contract; electoral autocracies; survey experiment.

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Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States

MATTHEW H. GRAHAM *Yale University*

MILAN W. SVOLIK *Yale University*

Is support for democracy in the United States robust enough to deter undemocratic behavior by elected politicians? We develop a model of the public as a democratic check and evaluate it using two empirical strategies: an original, nationally representative candidate-choice experiment in which some politicians take positions that violate key democratic principles, and a natural experiment that occurred during Montana's 2017 special election for the U.S. House. Our research design allows us to infer Americans' willingness to trade-off democratic principles for other valid but potentially conflicting considerations such as political ideology, partisan loyalty, and policy preferences. We find the U.S. public's viability as a democratic check to be strikingly limited: only a small fraction of Americans prioritize democratic principles in their electoral choices, and their tendency to do so is decreasing in several measures of polarization, including the strength of partisanship, policy extremism, and candidate platform divergence. Our findings echo classic arguments about the importance of political moderation and cross-cutting cleavages for democratic stability and highlight the dangers that polarization represents for democracy.

What to do?

The **challenge** for liberal, progressive politicians:

- Articulate a **clear comprehensive causal chain** arguing and showing that liberal democracy is compatible with order, security, and good governance.

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
- This is difficult to do today, because of the USA and UK.

Takeaways

1. **Democratic backsliding** is on the rise in Asia and elsewhere...
2. Characterized by episodes of **executive aggrandizement**...
3. Justified by rhetorical claims of **disorder**, which is fueled by perceived political instability and ineffective governance, which hence demands the need **to vote** for authoritarian characters to restore order and prosperity.
4. When confronted with **tradeoffs** between public order and authoritarianism versus disorder and democracy, recent research shows that voters choose the former...
5. The challenge then is to articulate and communicate **a clear causal chain** showing that democracy is compatible with order, security, and good governance.

END

First Book



- Why, how, and when do opposition alliances form against dominant autocratic incumbents?

- Objective is clear: Defeat the dominant incumbent.

- Strategies and tactics are clear and limited:

- Bargaining over candidate selection/allocation,
- policy compromises in joint manifestoes,
- general campaign messaging, and
- executive power-sharing arrangements.

Not so clear

What happens after opposition victory?

Objective of the government as a group

- Transitional justice? Revenge? Power holding? Societal change? Or?

Objectives of political parties in alliances may vary

- Some want small changes, some want big changes.

Tactics / Strategies of political parties in alliances may vary

- Mahathir in 2018-2020
- DAP in 2018-2020

Two Cases of Victorious Opposition Alliances

Private Pre-Electoral Bargains

Philippines in 1986



Reuters
Salvador H. Laurel and Corason C. Aquino after agreement in Manila.

*Philippine Opposition Works Out
Agreement for a Unified Ticket*



Private Bargain

- President and VP candidates contest under same party label
- VP to be made PM, 2 year ceremonial P, 30% of cabinet by VP, 70% via close consultation

Two Cases of Victorious Opposition Alliances

Public Pre-Electoral Bargains

Malaysia in 2018



Public Bargains

- Clearly coordinated candidate placement in electoral district
- Joint manifesto, 10 policies in 100 days
- PM and DPM candidates, and Anwar

Private Pre-Electoral Bargains

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Public variation and disagreement

1. Just like elites and political parties, mass supporters may disagree about what the objectives and strategies/tactics of new coalition government.
 - And the more public and clear what pre-electoral promises are, the more ideologically committed supporters handcuff their victorious elites to account.
2. Opposition endogenous weakness
 - The ideologically committed supporters of the opposition are the Achilles heel of the opposition because they lack patience and compromise (Hirschman).
3. Patience and compromise are commodities in short supply
 - Research on European coalition governments tell us that voters punish compromise. What more new democracies like Malaysia?

Pretext for Authoritarian Comeback

Result in:

- “The decline in public sentiment played a big part in contributing to the ultimate fall of the government. They played a key role in pushing segments of the Malay population and leaders to be chauvinist and nationalist. They lent a lot of legs towards the Sheraton Move.”
- “We painted ourselves into a corner. The UMNO+PAS opposition then use the narrative to countermobilize.”

MALAYSIA

The duo who stole Malaysia's democracy

Muhyiddin Yassin and Azmin Ali's 'Sheraton Move' coup has one year on resulted in nation's worst political crisis in decades

By NILE BOWIE
FEBRUARY 24, 2021



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Patience and Compromise

1. Once bitten, twice shy

- 2022 Unity government is trying to ask for more patience from ideologically committed supporters for political reforms. But unclear if the message is getting through.

2. Are PH/Unity government supporters ready for ideological compromise?

- Are liberal progressive voters willing to meet conservative voters half-way?
- What might they be willing to give up in order to get what they want?

3. New democracies like Malaysia

- Is it possible for new democracies like Malaysia to grow a culture of political compromise rather than partisan revenge?

Variation in Political Stability and Authoritarian Comebacks

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Malaysia: Malays rally amid worries over government 'weakness'

Thousands 'celebrate' move not to sign anti-discrimination treaty as others fear new government losing reform appetite.



People take part in an Anti-ICERD (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) mass rally in Kuala Lumpur. [Sadiq Asyraf/Reuters]

By **Kate Mayberry**
8 Dec 2018

Save articles to read later and create your own reading list

- In Malaysia, PH opposition alliance won against BN dominant incumbent in 2018.
 - Collapsed after 22 months via intra-alliance defection. BN returned to executive power.
 - Unable to implement most of its proposed policies in its election manifesto.
 - Unable to implement any pro-democratizing reforms to entrench democracy.

Variation in Political Stability and Authoritarian Comebacks

- In Philippines, Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel opposition alliance won against Ferdinand Marcos in 1986.
 - Aquino lasted for whole term until 1992. Government mostly stable despite resignations and coup attempts.
 - Stalled economic bleeding, limited land reform and peace talks with insurgent groups.
 - Philippine passed new constitution in 1987 that has never been changed since.



Two Cases of Victorious Opposition Alliances

Malaysia in 2018



Philippines in 1986



Salvador H. Laurel and Corazon C. Aquino after agreement in Manila.

Philippine Opposition Works Out Agreement for a Unified Ticket

Particularly puzzling:

- PH had 10 years of subnational governance experience, Aquino was housewife.
- Malaysian state is strong, military weak. Philippines state is weak, military strong.

Argument

After victory, political stability and authoritarian comeback is dependent on the nature of pre-electoral alliance bargains and promises

When pre-electoral alliance bargains and promises are “open”

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When alliance bargains are “closed” or when opposition party campaigns on vague promises of democratic change

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Argument

After victory, political stability and authoritarian comeback is dependent on the nature of pre-electoral alliance bargains and promises

When pre-electoral alliance bargains and promises are “open”

- The expectant **public** are conditioned on particular set of power-sharing and policy outcomes.
- Deviation from or renegeing from pre-electoral compromises leads to **public** disillusionment.
- Collapse in **public** support creates legitimacy for multiple pathways for authoritarian comeback.

When alliance bargains are “closed” or when opposition party campaigns on vague promises of democratic change

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When alliance bargains are “closed” or when opposition party campaigns on vague promises of democratic change

- The expectant **public** is not conditioned on specific outcomes.
- Deviation or reneging brings no consequences. **Public** may be disappointed but not disillusioned.
- Ex-authoritarian incumbent is marginalized. Democracy is preserved or dismantled via desperate coup.

Two Cases of Victorious Opposition Alliances

Open Pre-Electoral Bargains

Malaysia in 2018



Open Bargains

- Clearly coordinated candidate placement in electoral district
- Joint manifesto, 10 policies in 100 days
- PM and DPM candidates, and Anwar

In Malaysia, Deviation and Reneging



Malaysian PM Mahathir says he will hand power over to Anwar within 3 years



Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said that the government needs three years to reduce Malaysia's debt from 80 per cent of domestic product to 54 per cent. PHOTO: REUTERS

NEWS

You Can Now Track All of Pakatan Harapan's Campaign Promises on This Website

Published 5 years ago June 11, 2018
By [Tara Thiagarajan](#)



Source: Malay Mail

Sometimes can, sometimes can't – manifesto not 'Bible': Dr M

Kow Gah Chie

Published: Jul 16, 2018 3:20 PM • Updated: Jul 20, 2018 6:58 AM

The Tragedy of Governance Ineffectiveness (1)

Rush to purge

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Overwhelmed and lack of prioritization

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The Tragedy of Governance Ineffectiveness (1)

Rush to purge

- “A senior ministry bureaucrat gave us a list of BN friendly heads of government agencies. We fired all of them in one fell swoop.”
- “We had checks that had to be signed by the head of government agency, but there was no one to sign them.”

Overwhelmed and lack of prioritization

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The Tragedy of Governance Ineffectiveness (1)

Rush to purge

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- “We had checks that had to be signed by the head of government agency, but there was no one to sign them.”

Overwhelmed and lack of prioritization

- “My initial days at my ministry was like drinking from a fire hose.”
- “My minister was running around like a headline chicken”
- “The government trying to do reforms on everything everywhere all at once trying to be the jack of all trades and master of none.”

The Tragedy of Governance Ineffectiveness (2)

Lack of communication within ministry, across ministries, and with backbenchers

-

Ideological conflict between DAP and Bersatu

-

-

The Tragedy of Governance Ineffectiveness (2)

Lack of communication within ministry, across ministries, and with backbenchers

- “Ministers were working in silos... there was a complete breakdown in government communications...”

Ideological conflict between DAP and Bersatu

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The Tragedy of Governance Ineffectiveness (2)

Lack of communication within ministry, across ministries, and with backbenchers

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Ideological conflict between DAP and Bersatu

- Bersatu was trying to increase their support from the Malays but the “effectiveness” of DAP lead to perceptions of Chinese leadership.
- Mahathir distracted by need to shore up his own party’s position. Bersatu won 9.9% of seats, controlled 22.2% of ministries.

Pretext for Authoritarian Comeback

Resulted in:

- “The decline in public sentiment played a big part in contributing to the ultimate fall of the government. They played a key role in pushing segments of the Malay population and leaders to be chauvinist and nationalist. They lent a lot of legs towards the Sheraton Move.”
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MALAYSIA

The duo who stole Malaysia's democracy

Muhyiddin Yassin and Azmin Ali's 'Sheraton Move' coup has one year on resulted in nation's worst political crisis in decades

By NILE BOWIE
FEBRUARY 24, 2021



Two Cases of Victorious Opposition Alliances

Closed Pre-Electoral Bargains

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Philippine Opposition Works Out Agreement for a Unified Ticket



Closed Bargain

- President and VP candidates contest under same party label
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In Philippines, Reneging



Salvador H. Laurel

(November 18, 1928 – January 27, 2004).

Lawyer, legislator, Vice-President, 1986-1992.

Tasked by his father to write a diary of their escape to Japan, 1945; kept a diary of the Snap Election campaign of 1985-6.

All Posts

Diary of Salvador H. Laurel

February 27, 1986

I met with Cory to decide the choice of Cabinet members per our agreement. At this time Cory and I were in close consultation. We were meeting everyday, sometimes twice a day –mainly on the choice of Cabinet members and urgent priority items to act on. I submitted names on the basis of our agreement that there would be close consultation of the composition of the Cabinet. At this point I noticed that she was not following our agreement. She rejected my recommendations except for one (H. Perez). (She cannot decide).

survived. To ensure full legislative support, a “package proclamation” was to be pre-signed by the new Batasan majority. This would include the proclamation of the President and the Vice President, the election of the Prime Minister, the adoption of the emergency powers proclamation, the approved timetable for the transition, the inauguration of the new government, the writing of a new constitution, and the holding of elections. This was, in effect, a fast-track plan to achieve immediate constitutional normalcy and political stability.

Accordingly, a report embodying the consensus was drafted by Atty. Avelino V. Cruz, representing the Vice President and Prime Minister, Atty. Fulgencio Factoran, representing Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, and Atty. Minerva Reyes and Reynato Puno, representing Minister Neptali Gonzales.

But this agreement was never implemented. Nor was I ever told that the agreed plan had been junked and that another plan had been hatched and would suddenly be executed. It was political treachery at its worst. Obviously, a new power group had taken over in Malacañang.¹⁰

In Philippines, Medium Effectiveness

YORK TIMES INTERNATIONAL NEWS FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1987

Y 3

Aquino, Under Pressure, Removes Her Closest Adviser

By SETH MYDANS
Special to The New York Times

MANILA, Sept. 17 — President Corazon C. Aquino bowed to intense political pressure today and announced the removal of her closest adviser, Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo.

gested that Mrs. Aquino would be likely to maintain close ties with her most trusted adviser.

Laurel Plans Campaign

Mr. Laurel, who broke with the President complaining of exclusion from her inner circle, said today that

The mass resignation of the 25-member Cabinet, which led to Mr. Arroyo's ouster, came the day after his Congressional appearance.

The military maintains that Mr. Arroyo is sympathetic to Communist

rebels, though his record in office does not support this charge.

Mr. Macaraig, 60 years old, a college classmate of Mr. Arroyo's, was a deputy justice minister under the former President, Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Ms.
OCTOBER 1987

BETWEEN THE GUN AND THE CRUCIFIX



Cory Aquino and the Women of the Philippines
BY NINOTCHKA ROSCA

PHOTOGRAPHS BY SUSAN MEISELAS

One blistering January afternoon in the midst of the turbulent Philippine presidential campaign, a propaganda van parked at an alley's mouth in downtown Manila and unleashed a shrieking female voice from the loudspeakers on its roof. "In these times of crisis," went the harangue, "what the country needs is a man! A bull! A STUD! Vote Marcos, Marcos, MARCOS!" Female pedestrians walked around the vehicle with elaborate nonchalance. A hundred yards away, however, some looked back, faces rippling, and, compelled by sudden anger, spat on the sidewalk. Farther away, a block or two down the road, the reaction was stronger: muttered curses, or the desirive question: "And can he still get it up?"

in the 7,100-island archipelago by Spanish colonial rule and the Roman Catholic Church. But in this instance, no one even blinked at the prospect of a woman president, a testimony to the tenacity with which Filipinas had fought, in the 14 years since the imposition of martial law, for their place under the sun. It is also proof of the anger provoked by the anti-woman policies of the Marcos regime.

None of her male predecessors enjoyed the profound affection that is Cory Aquino's, despite her self-characterization as "a plain housewife" with no political experience. Ordinary citizens stammer over the official-sounding "President Aquino"—she's Cory, President Cory, Mrs. Cory, Tita (Auntie) Cory. Even Antonio

4 Saturday, January 23, 1988 Manila, Luzon

Editorial

EDITOR/Berry Pelaez-Marfori

Factors that erode Cory's magic

THE ELECTORATE, it seems, has given President Aquino another vote of confidence. Many of her personal candidates for local government positions have won, proving the prophets of doom who had predicted the demise of the Cory magic wrong.


To be sure, the confidence given Mrs. Aquino is no longer in the mammoth proportions an adoring populace displayed during the snap elections, the plebiscite and the congressional polls. The last crisis-filled 23 months have taken their toll on her popularity and credibility. Nevertheless, the magic is there and it should be enough to keep her going until the end of her term.

That is, if she doesn't blow it. The decline in the President's ratings can only be traced to her and how she has acted or reacted to basic issues like graft and corruption, military madness, dynasty building, social jus-

stice and human rights. For no matter how many experts she holds responsible for these things, the people know that the buck stops where she sits.

There are several easy ways for the President to erode the remaining support she has. First, she can continue acting like a traditional politician playing ball with the discredited remnants of the Marcos regime. We didn't risk our lives fighting the dictator for 14 years for this, a lot of her supporters said in disgust over the unholy alliances made for and in her behalf during the last campaign.

Second, she can continue to share power — formally and informally — with members of her family by allowing her assorted relatives to assert their influence in Government and assume control of the political parties in the ruling coalition. The voters have spoken.



Political dynasties are out: An Aquino-Cojuangco-Sumulong dynasty is even less tolerable than others. I suspect this is because our people insist that Cory Aquino be totally above board. The fact that she has Kokoy-like shadowy political relatives hovering about turns off even the most rabid Cory-ites.

Third, she can allow graft and corruption to go unchecked. Despite her fighting rhetoric, people are dismayed at the lack of political will to contain these evils.

Fourth, she can continue

taking the cudgels for the landed and big business with conservative positions on social justice issues like agrarian reform and labor policies.

While her watered-down idea of agrarian reform has won her some praise from her peers in the landed class, it has lost her valuable support from the grassroots. And while she has made investors happy with her nonsense approach to labor strife, her support among the large labor sector is dwindling.


Finally, she can continue to allow the Armed Forces and other interested parties to dictate on her militarist counterinsurgency policies. Such policies merely kill communist rebels, government soldiers and non-combatants, constrict the democratic space she has created, and lead to the violation of human rights. But they do not bring us any closer to solving the injustices

that have brought about the insurgency.

The local election, Mrs. Aquino said, was the last step in the restoration of democracy in the country. There are those, of course, who would dispute that. The mechanics of democracy are in place, they say, but not the essence. Rather than establish a government of the people, for the people, and by the people, the congressional and local elections have merely consolidated a new oligarchy, say the cynics.

But, granted that democracy is in place as the Government insists, there is only one way Mrs. Aquino and her Government should go. And that is, with the people, the teeming masses who elected her and her choices for public office in the hope that her campaign promise of genuine democracy, social justice, human rights and good government will finally be fulfilled.

August 31 - September 6, 1987



BURN SEITZ/FILE PHOTO/REUTERS in Manila

They don't like 'small change'

PHILIPPINES

Aquino gets lesson in 'people power'

By Clayton Jones
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Manila
Having restored democracy to the Philippines, President Corazon Aquino now knows how easy it is to be a victim of democracy.

On Aug. 25, she was forced to partially roll back a fuel price increase in the face of leftist-led transport strikes and street protests. Transport workers, calling the partial rollback "small change," responded by staging the largest strike in Mrs. Aquino's 18 months in power. The impression here is that Aquino is vulnerable.

In Philippines, Potential Authoritarian Comeback?



Filipino Opposition Leaders Form Anti-Aquino Coalition

MANILA, Saturday, Aug. 27 (AP) — Vice President Salvador H. Laurel and opposition leaders today announced the formation of a new coalition to challenge President Corazon C. Aquino.

"I accept the honor and the challenge to lead a coalesced opposition against a blundering and immoral administration that has betrayed the people," Mr. Laurel said.

Aquino Foes Form an Alliance Ready for Power

By SETH MYDANS
Special to The New York Times

MANILA, Oct. 9 — Philippine opposition politicians say they have reached a tentative alliance that would be ready to assume power if President Corazon C. Aquino is removed by violence or political pressure.

In interviews this week, the politicians said they had agreed that Vice President Salvador H. Laurel, who broke politically with Mrs. Aquino last month, would be their titular leader and the man they would back as president if Mrs. Aquino was removed.

One opposition politician who asked not to be identified said that Mr. Laurel met late last month with Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to discuss an alliance and that an agreement would be announced soon. Senator Enrile is considered Mrs. Aquino's chief political challenger.

The politician said advice from American right-wing groups opposed to Mrs. Aquino had played a part in the decision to forge an alliance, with Mr. Laurel at its head, that would offer a

faculty, and planned to set up 27 policy councils to match the main jurisdictions of Government, a format some politicians are calling a "shadow government."

Mr. Ople said such an opposition grouping would offer "a second leg" for the Aquino democracy to stand on and could help stabilize the Government against extra-constitutional challenges.

But it appears that most members of the new coalition are looking toward an assumption of power well before Mrs. Aquino's term expires in 1992, in what is being called a "constitutional coup."

Continuing Coup Rumors

It is not clear just how this might happen, but the stability and the survival of the Aquino Government have come into question since a coup attempt on Aug. 28 and a continuing series of coup rumors.

At the time of the coup attempt, no organized opposition grouping was in place to offer a workable alternative political framework

tion where in all the military regions the flag is just reversed one morning, and you have the left on a rampage in urban areas, and thus it becomes totally clear that the President has lost control of events," he said. "She may have no army to command." The reversed flag was the signal used by mutineers in the August coup attempt.

"In such a situation, it will then be the duty of the Vice President to assume office under the Constitution," Mr. Ople said.

Several opposition figures voiced their reservations about Mr. Laurel, whom they described as a political opportunist in his break with the President and flirtation with the opposition.

"We have to work with what we've got," Mr. Tatad said. "Doy may not represent a better quality of leadership, but he's a practical politician, and a team could in fact work from out of the cabinet." Doy is Mr. Laurel's nickname.

Mr. Ople said some Enrile supporters continued to oppose giving the top position to Mr. Laurel. But he said, "Enrile could wield influence in a Laurel administration as co-architect of a new government and would receive a becoming share of posts in the new government."

New Foreign Minister Named

MANILA, Oct. 9 (AP) — President Aquino today nominated Senator Raul Manglapus, a longtime lawmaker and critic of the United States military role here, as Foreign Minister.

Mrs. Aquino announced that she was nominating Mr. Manglapus, 68 years old, because the nation "needs a man of exceptional ability, dedication, intelligence and experience to guide our foreign relations." Vice President Laurel resigned as Foreign Minister last month because of differences with Mrs. Aquino.

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In Philippines, Nope!

AQUINO CANDIDATES FARE WELL IN VOTE FOR NEW CONGRESS

A NEAR SWEEP IN SENATE

Early Tally Suggests President
Retains Filipinos' Trust —
Enrile Issues a Protest

By SETH MYDANS
Special to The New York Times

MANILA, May 12 — Senatorial candidates supported by President Corazon C. Aquino appeared today to be headed for an overwhelming victory. The vote seemed to reflect the wide

popularity of Mrs. Aquino's power nearly 15 months ago. Some opposition election irregularities they might not accept voting Monday. It seemed to be the calm accounts the most years. Most comment they saw as the count democratic government.

A Near Sweep

Final, official respected for up to two scattered, unofficial pattern appeared showing a near sweep reported candidates fate, which is elected.

The race for the 24 of Representatives difficult to project, although turns gave an edge candidates. Under the 50 remain by presidential appointment.

Mrs. Aquino's slate diverse group united by the president's endorsement, is expected to begin to fragment once the legislature convenes in July.

Already, behind-the-scenes maneuvering appeared to have begun among candidates who covet the powerful Senate presidency and ultimately the presidency of the Philippines in the next election in 1992.

As Pro-Aquino Vote Rises, Foes Are 'Stunned'

By SETH MYDANS
Special to The New York Times

MANILA, May 16 — Legislative candidates backed by President Corazon C. Aquino consolidated their lead today, and their opponents appeared uncertain on how to press a threatened protest.

As an unofficial "quick count" of the results of the election last Monday passed 60 percent, the President's candidates led in 23 of the 24 Senate seats and were ahead in most of the 200 races for the House of Representatives.

The counting of the long and complicated ballots was proceeding slowly, and the official tally was expected to

take up to two weeks.

Both right-wing and left-wing opposition groups charged a variety of election irregularities. But no one had produced evidence of the kind of broad or coordinated fraud and intimidation that was common under the former President, Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Members of the right-wing Grand Alliance for Democracy pledged a series of rallies to promote their call for a nullification of the vote, which they said was marred by fraud.

On Thursday, former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile led a protest of more than 10,000 people who chanted, "Cory is a cheater!" The demonstra-

tors, many of them from among a small hard-core of Marcos loyalists, did not appear to reflect the sentiments of most of the nation.

Enrile Misses a Date

A columnist for The Philippine Daily Star, Louis Beltran, wrote: "There is little doubt that the general mass of Filipinos is not with them. The reason is obvious. Too many of those protesting now were themselves the cheaters during the Marcos regime, when their victims — unlike themselves — were not even allowed to demonstrate the way they are now doing."

Mr. Enrile scheduled a new confer-

ence for today and then did not attend. Echoing the general sentiment among newspaper commentators here, Mrs. Aquino told reporters: "We have worked hard and sacrificed so much to bring back democracy. I would be the last person to resort to foul means."

Mrs. Aquino's opponents seemed shocked by the thorough defeat that appeared to be in the making.

"People are stunned in disbelief; they could not believe that it is 23 to 1," said Wilson Gamboa, a losing senatorial candidate who joined the opposition after he failed to gain an endorsement from the President.

"This administration always dwells on righteousness, religiosity and morality," he said. "This is too much self-righteousness, bordering on arrogance."



Corazon Aquino at
Constitution Rally

Takeaways

1. Pre-electoral agreements have consequences for post-election governance
 - The more open and clear what the bargains and promises are, the more partisan supporters handcuff their victorious elites to account.
2. Opposition endogenous weakness
 - The partisan supporters of the opposition are the Achilles heel of the opposition because they lack patience and compromise (Hirschman).

Any suggestions?

How should we think about other opposition victory cases in Asia?


- South Korea Kim Dae Jung 1997/1998
- Democratic Party of Japan 2009
- Taiwan Chen Shui Bian 2000
- Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi in 2015

Who to Interview?

1. In Philippines?
2. Elsewhere?

Heightened Expectations and Collapse

Approval Rating of Malaysia's Prime Minister



Curious Similarities to Another Case in East Asia

“The Public”

Supporters of the opposition play two roles:

1. They are the audience of “open” bargains and promises
2. They are the enforcers of “open” bargains and promises

Supporters of the opposition are:

1. Partisan core supporters.
2. Swing voters taking a calculated risk.

After victory:

- Neither partisan core supporters nor swing voters will be fully satisfied because of impatience and inability to compromise



Curious Similarities to Another Case in East Asia



Curious Similarities to Another Case in East Asia



Curious Similarities to Another Case in East Asia

Party system dynamics in post-war Japan: A quantitative content analysis of electoral pledges

Sven-Oliver Proksch^a, Jonathan B. Slapin^b, Michael F. Thies^{c,*}

^aMZES University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany

^bDepartment of Political Science, University of Houston, Philip Guthrie Hoffman Hall Room 447, Houston, TX 77204-3011, United States

^cDepartment of Political Science, UCLA, 405 Hilgard Ave, P.O. Box 915472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472, United States

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ABSTRACT

Qualitative accounts of Japanese party politics allude to the standard left-right spectrum, but they invariably devote much more space to discussions of foreign policy differences than to socioeconomic conflict. Quantitative estimates of Japanese party positions treat short party responses to newspaper interviews as if they were true manifestos, and fail both to confirm the claims of the qualitative literature and to demonstrate any consistent basis for party differentiation at all. We address both puzzles by applying a text scaling algorithm to electoral pledges to estimate Japanese party positions on three major policy dimensions. Our analysis largely confirms the findings of the qualitative literature, but also offers new insights about party movement and polarization over time.

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PA Measuring Voters' Multidimensional Policy Preferences with Conjoint Analysis: Application to Japan's 2014 Election

Yusaku Horiuchi¹, Daniel M. Smith² and Teppei Yamamoto³

¹Professor of Government and Mitsui Professor of Japanese Studies, Department of Government, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA. Email: yusaku.horiuchi@dartmouth.edu, URL: <https://sites.dartmouth.edu/horiuchi/>

²Associate Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. Email: danielmsmith@fas.harvard.edu, URL: <https://sites.google.com/site/danielmarkhamsmith>

³Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. Email: teppey@mit.edu, URL: <http://web.mit.edu/teppey/www>

Abstract

Representative democracy entails the aggregation of multiple policy issues by parties into competing bundles of policies, or "manifestos," which are then evaluated holistically by voters in elections. This aggregation process obscures the *multidimensional* policy preferences underlying a voter's *single* choice of party or candidate. We address this problem through a conjoint experiment based on the actual party manifestos in Japan's 2014 House of Representatives election. By juxtaposing sets of issue positions as hypothetical manifestos and asking respondents to choose one, our study identifies the effects of specific positions on the overall assessment of manifestos, heterogeneity in preferences among subgroups of respondents, and the popularity ranking of manifestos. Our analysis uncovers important discrepancies between voter preferences and the portrayal of the election results by politicians and the media as providing a policy mandate to the Liberal Democratic Party, underscoring the potential danger of inferring public opinion from election outcomes alone.

Gender differences in campaigning under alternative voting systems: analysis of election manifestos

Yoshikuni Ono^a and Hirofumi Miwa^b

^aFaculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan; ^bFaculty of Law, Gakushuin University, Tokyo, Japan

ABSTRACT

Growing evidence reveals that candidate issue engagement differs between men and women. However, recent research suggests that individual-level differences among candidates should be small under the strategic incentives inherent in single-member district elections that encourage party rather than personal-vote seeking. We examine whether men and women candidates emphasize different issues in their electoral campaigns and if the magnitude of the gender gap varies under different electoral rules. Our analysis of 7497 Japanese election manifestos spanning more than 20 years, from 1986 to 2009, reveals significant gender differences in the issues candidates emphasize in their electoral campaigns, regardless of party affiliation or other attributes. Moreover, these differences remain salient after an extensive change from a multi-member district to single-member district electoral system.

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Gender; candidate; election; campaign manifesto; electoral system; text analysis


From Pork to Policy: The Rise of Programmatic Campaigning in Japanese Elections

Amy Catalinac, New York University

We examine two related propositions central to the subfield of comparative politics: that candidates for office adopt different electoral strategies under different electoral systems and rely more on particularism when faced with intraparty competition. We apply an innovative methodological approach that combines probabilistic topic modeling with in-depth qualitative interpretations of each topic to an original collection of 7,497 Japanese-language candidate election manifestos used in elections on either side of Japan's 1994 electoral reform. We find that the reform, which eliminated intraparty competition, was associated with a decline in particularism and an increase in promises of programmatic goods such as national security among candidates affiliated with Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. This is not explained by the entry of new candidates or other variables that could plausibly increase discussion of national security. Consistent with the theory, we find that opposition candidates relied on programmatic goods under both electoral systems.

Curious Similarities to Another Case in East Asia

Approval Rating of Cabinets in Japan (As Reported in NHK)





Curious Similarities to Another Case in East Asia

Collapse in Public Support

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Why?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.





Curious Similarities to Another Case in East Asia

Collapse in Public Support

- Inability to implement its manifesto pledges

Why?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.





Curious Similarities to Another Case in East Asia

Collapse in Public Support

- Inability to implement its manifesto pledges

Why?

1. Sidetracked by scandals and other matters
2. Governance inexperience
3. Inability to resolve intra-party conflicts
4. Open to attacks by “new” opposition LDP



Future Book Project / Research

Another Theory Testing Case of “Closed” or “Vague” Opposition Victory?

- South Korea Kim Dae Jung 1997/1998?
- Taiwan Chen Shui Bian 2000?

The Role of “The Public”

1. Which parts of “the public” impatient and cannot accept compromise? Why?
2. Is it a problem for democracy if “the public” is impatient and cannot compromise?

Election Manifestoes

1. Election manifestoes hold politicians to account, but what if they cause people to lose interest or faith in politics and democracy and lower turnout over time?

Takeaways

1. Pre-electoral agreements have consequences for post-election governance
 - The more open and clear what the bargains and promises are, the more partisan supporters handcuff their victorious elites to account.
2. But the irony is that open and clear pre-electoral bargains and promises are precisely what are needed to win in the first place
 - For supporters to know what they are voting for, and for the public to act as enforcers and resolve the credible commitment problem.
3. Opposition endogenous weakness
 - The partisan supporters of the opposition are the Achilles heel of the opposition because they lack patience and compromise (Hirschman).

Motivation



- **Personal - In Singapore, the PAP has been the dominant party since 1965 for almost six decades.**
 - Although its continued popularity seems assured, its vote share has been declining over time.

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Motivation



- **Personal - In Singapore, the PAP has been the dominant party since 1965 for almost six decades.**
 - Although its continued popularity seems assured, its vote share has been declining over time.
- **Academic – Scholars have been obsessed with studying democratic backsliding.**
 - What might opposition parties do if they win against populist autocrats seems to be open to debate.